We propose PRISM-FCP (Partial shaRing and robust calIbration with Statistical Margins for Federated Conformal Prediction), a Byzantine-resilient federated conformal prediction framework that utilizes partial model sharing to improve robustness against Byzantine attacks during both model training and conformal calibration. Existing approaches address adversarial behavior only in the calibration stage, leaving the learned model susceptible to poisoned updates. In contrast, PRISM-FCP mitigates attacks end-to-end. During training, clients partially share updates by transmitting only $M$ of $D$ parameters per round. This attenuates the expected energy of an adversary's perturbation in the aggregated update by a factor of $M/D$, yielding lower mean-square error (MSE) and tighter prediction intervals. During calibration, clients convert nonconformity scores into characterization vectors, compute distance-based maliciousness scores, and downweight or filter suspected Byzantine contributions before estimating the conformal quantile. Extensive experiments on both synthetic data and the UCI Superconductivity dataset demonstrate that PRISM-FCP maintains nominal coverage guarantees under Byzantine attacks while avoiding the interval inflation observed in standard FCP with reduced communication, providing a robust and communication-efficient approach to federated uncertainty quantification.

Discrete image tokenizers encode visual inputs as sequences of tokens from a finite vocabulary and are gaining popularity in multimodal systems, including encoder-only, encoder-decoder, and decoder-only models. However, unlike CLIP encoders, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks has not been explored. Ours being the first work studying this topic, we first formulate attacks that aim to perturb the features extracted by discrete tokenizers, and thus change the extracted tokens. These attacks are computationally efficient, application-agnostic, and effective across classification, multimodal retrieval, and captioning tasks. Second, to defend against this vulnerability, inspired by recent work on robust CLIP encoders, we fine-tune popular tokenizers with unsupervised adversarial training, keeping all other components frozen. While unsupervised and task-agnostic, our approach significantly improves robustness to both unsupervised and end-to-end supervised attacks and generalizes well to unseen tasks and data. Unlike supervised adversarial training, our approach can leverage unlabeled images, making it more versatile. Overall, our work highlights the critical role of tokenizer robustness in downstream tasks and presents an important step in the development of safe multimodal foundation models.

Machine learning (ML) models are susceptible to various risks to security, privacy, and fairness. Most defenses are designed to protect against each risk individually (intended interactions) but can inadvertently affect susceptibility to other unrelated risks (unintended interactions). We introduce Amulet, the first Python library for evaluating both intended and unintended interactions among ML defenses and risks. Amulet is comprehensive by including representative attacks, defenses, and metrics; extensible to new modules due to its modular design; consistent with a user-friendly API template for inputs and outputs; and applicable for evaluating novel interactions. By satisfying all four properties, Amulet offers a unified foundation for studying how defenses interact, enabling the first systematic evaluation of unintended interactions across multiple risks.

In federated learning, multiple parties train models locally and share their parameters with a central server, which aggregates them to update a global model. To address the risk of exposing sensitive data through local models, secure aggregation via secure multiparty computation has been proposed to enhance privacy. At the same time, perfect privacy can only be achieved by a uniform distribution of the masked local models to be aggregated. This raises a problem when working with real valued data, as there is no measure on the reals that is invariant under the masking operation, and hence information leakage is bound to occur. Shifting the data to a finite field circumvents this problem, but as a downside runs into an inherent accuracy complexity tradeoff issue due to fixed point modular arithmetic as opposed to floating point numbers that can simultaneously handle numbers of varying magnitudes. In this paper, a novel secure parameter aggregation method is proposed that employs the torus rather than a finite field. This approach guarantees perfect privacy for each party's data by utilizing the uniform distribution on the torus, while avoiding accuracy losses. Experimental results show that the new protocol performs similarly to the model without secure aggregation while maintaining perfect privacy. Compared to the finite field secure aggregation, the torus-based protocol can in some cases significantly outperform it in terms of model accuracy and cosine similarity, hence making it a safer choice.