On the Adversarial Robustness of Discrete Image Tokenizers
Rishika Bhagwatkar 1, Irina Rish 1, Nicolas Flammarion 2, Francesco Croce 3
Published on arXiv
2602.18252
Input Manipulation Attack
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML01
Key Finding
Unsupervised adversarial training of discrete image tokenizers substantially improves robustness to both unsupervised and supervised attacks while generalizing to unseen tasks without requiring labeled data.
Discrete image tokenizers encode visual inputs as sequences of tokens from a finite vocabulary and are gaining popularity in multimodal systems, including encoder-only, encoder-decoder, and decoder-only models. However, unlike CLIP encoders, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks has not been explored. Ours being the first work studying this topic, we first formulate attacks that aim to perturb the features extracted by discrete tokenizers, and thus change the extracted tokens. These attacks are computationally efficient, application-agnostic, and effective across classification, multimodal retrieval, and captioning tasks. Second, to defend against this vulnerability, inspired by recent work on robust CLIP encoders, we fine-tune popular tokenizers with unsupervised adversarial training, keeping all other components frozen. While unsupervised and task-agnostic, our approach significantly improves robustness to both unsupervised and end-to-end supervised attacks and generalizes well to unseen tasks and data. Unlike supervised adversarial training, our approach can leverage unlabeled images, making it more versatile. Overall, our work highlights the critical role of tokenizer robustness in downstream tasks and presents an important step in the development of safe multimodal foundation models.
Key Contributions
- First systematic study of adversarial vulnerability in discrete image tokenizers, formulating computationally efficient, application-agnostic attacks that alter codebook token assignments
- Unsupervised adversarial training defense that fine-tunes tokenizer encoders without labels, significantly improving robustness to both unsupervised and end-to-end supervised attacks
- Demonstration that tokenizer robustness critically impacts downstream multimodal tasks (classification, retrieval, captioning) and generalizes to unseen tasks and data distributions
🛡️ Threat Analysis
Proposes gradient-based adversarial perturbations that change tokens extracted by discrete image tokenizers at inference time, causing downstream task failures across classification, retrieval, and captioning; the defense is unsupervised adversarial training of the tokenizer — a canonical ML01 defense.