Topology Matters: Measuring Memory Leakage in Multi-Agent LLMs
Jinbo Liu 1, Defu Cao 1, Yifei Wei 1, Tianyao Su 1, Yuan Liang 1, Yushun Dong 2, Yan Liu 1, Yue Zhao 1, Xiyang Hu 3
Published on arXiv
2512.04668
Sensitive Information Disclosure
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM06
Key Finding
Fully connected topologies leak the most PII and chain topologies the least; topology ordering is stable across base models, and spatiotemporal/location attributes leak more readily than identity credentials or regulated identifiers
MAMA (Multi-Agent Memory Attack)
Novel technique introduced
Graph topology is a fundamental determinant of memory leakage in multi-agent LLM systems, yet its effects remain poorly quantified. We introduce MAMA (Multi-Agent Memory Attack), a framework that measures how network structure shapes leakage. MAMA operates on synthetic documents containing labeled Personally Identifiable Information (PII) entities, from which we generate sanitized task instructions. We execute a two-phase protocol: Engram (seeding private information into a target agent's memory) and Resonance (multi-round interaction where an attacker attempts extraction). Over 10 rounds, we measure leakage as exact-match recovery of ground-truth PII from attacker outputs. We evaluate six canonical topologies (complete, ring, chain, tree, star, star-ring) across $n\in\{4,5,6\}$, attacker-target placements, and base models. Results are consistent: denser connectivity, shorter attacker-target distance, and higher target centrality increase leakage; most leakage occurs in early rounds and then plateaus; model choice shifts absolute rates but preserves topology ordering; spatiotemporal/location attributes leak more readily than identity credentials or regulated identifiers. We distill practical guidance for system design: favor sparse or hierarchical connectivity, maximize attacker-target separation, and restrict hub/shortcut pathways via topology-aware access control.
Key Contributions
- MAMA framework: a two-phase protocol (Engram for seeding PII into agent memory; Resonance for multi-round adversarial extraction) enabling reproducible measurement of topology-driven PII leakage
- Empirical analysis across six canonical topologies showing denser connectivity, shorter attacker-target path length, and higher target centrality consistently increase leakage rates across agent counts and base models
- Actionable design guidance: prefer sparse or hierarchical topologies, maximize attacker-target graph distance, and restrict hub/shortcut pathways via topology-aware access control