BlindGuard: Safeguarding LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems under Unknown Attacks
Rui Miao 1,2, Yixin Liu 2, Yili Wang 1, Xu Shen 1, Yue Tan 3, Yiwei Dai 1, Shirui Pan 2, Xin Wang 1
Published on arXiv
2508.08127
Excessive Agency
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM08
Prompt Injection
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM01
Key Finding
BlindGuard detects prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool attacks across MAS with diverse communication patterns, outperforming supervised baselines in generalizability without requiring any labeled malicious agent data.
BlindGuard
Novel technique introduced
The security of LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) is critically threatened by propagation vulnerability, where malicious agents can distort collective decision-making through inter-agent message interactions. While existing supervised defense methods demonstrate promising performance, they may be impractical in real-world scenarios due to their heavy reliance on labeled malicious agents to train a supervised malicious detection model. To enable practical and generalizable MAS defenses, in this paper, we propose BlindGuard, an unsupervised defense method that learns without requiring any attack-specific labels or prior knowledge of malicious behaviors. To this end, we establish a hierarchical agent encoder to capture individual, neighborhood, and global interaction patterns of each agent, providing a comprehensive understanding for malicious agent detection. Meanwhile, we design a corruption-guided detector that consists of directional noise injection and contrastive learning, allowing effective detection model training solely on normal agent behaviors. Extensive experiments show that BlindGuard effectively detects diverse attack types (i.e., prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool attack) across MAS with various communication patterns while maintaining superior generalizability compared to supervised baselines. The code is available at: https://github.com/MR9812/BlindGuard.
Key Contributions
- Unsupervised malicious agent detection for LLM-based MAS requiring no attack-specific labels or prior knowledge of malicious behaviors
- Hierarchical agent encoder capturing individual, neighborhood, and global interaction patterns across the agent communication graph
- Corruption-guided detector combining directional noise injection and contrastive learning, trained solely on normal agent behavior