Shirui Pan

Large Language Model (LLM) watermarking embeds detectable signals into generated text for copyright protection, misuse prevention, and content detection. While prior studies evaluate robustness using watermark removal attacks, these methods are often suboptimal, creating the misconception that effective removal requires large perturbations or powerful adversaries. To bridge the gap, we first formalize the system model for LLM watermark, and characterize two realistic threat models constrained on limited access to the watermark detector. We then analyze how different types of perturbation vary in their attack range, i.e., the number of tokens they can affect with a single edit. We observe that character-level perturbations (e.g., typos, swaps, deletions, homoglyphs) can influence multiple tokens simultaneously by disrupting the tokenization process. We demonstrate that character-level perturbations are significantly more effective for watermark removal under the most restrictive threat model. We further propose guided removal attacks based on the Genetic Algorithm (GA) that uses a reference detector for optimization. Under a practical threat model with limited black-box queries to the watermark detector, our method demonstrates strong removal performance. Experiments confirm the superiority of character-level perturbations and the effectiveness of the GA in removing watermarks under realistic constraints. Additionally, we argue there is an adversarial dilemma when considering potential defenses: any fixed defense can be bypassed by a suitable perturbation strategy. Motivated by this principle, we propose an adaptive compound character-level attack. Experimental results show that this approach can effectively defeat the defenses. Our findings highlight significant vulnerabilities in existing LLM watermark schemes and underline the urgency for the development of new robust mechanisms.

Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training by sharing model updates instead of raw data, aiming to protect user privacy. However, recent studies reveal that these shared updates can inadvertently leak sensitive training data through gradient inversion attacks (GIAs). Among them, active GIAs are particularly powerful, enabling high-fidelity reconstruction of individual samples even under large batch sizes. Nevertheless, existing approaches often require architectural modifications, which limit their practical applicability. In this work, we bridge this gap by introducing the Activation REcovery via Sparse inversion (ARES) attack, an active GIA designed to reconstruct training samples from large training batches without requiring architectural modifications. Specifically, we formulate the recovery problem as a noisy sparse recovery task and solve it using the generalized Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (Lasso). To extend the attack to multi-sample recovery, ARES incorporates the imprint method to disentangle activations, enabling scalable per-sample reconstruction. We further establish the expected recovery rate and derive an upper bound on the reconstruction error, providing theoretical guarantees for the ARES attack. Extensive experiments on CNNs and MLPs demonstrate that ARES achieves high-fidelity reconstruction across diverse datasets, significantly outperforming prior GIAs under large batch sizes and realistic FL settings. Our results highlight that intermediate activations pose a serious and underestimated privacy risk in FL, underscoring the urgent need for stronger defenses.

Graph-structured data, which captures non-Euclidean relationships and interactions between entities, is growing in scale and complexity. As a result, training state-of-the-art graph machine learning (GML) models have become increasingly resource-intensive, turning these models and data into invaluable Intellectual Property (IP). To address the resource-intensive nature of model training, graph-based Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (GMLaaS) has emerged as an efficient solution by leveraging third-party cloud services for model development and management. However, deploying such models in GMLaaS also exposes them to potential threats from attackers. Specifically, while the APIs within a GMLaaS system provide interfaces for users to query the model and receive outputs, they also allow attackers to exploit and steal model functionalities or sensitive training data, posing severe threats to the safety of these GML models and the underlying graph data. To address these challenges, this survey systematically introduces the first taxonomy of threats and defenses at the level of both GML model and graph-structured data. Such a tailored taxonomy facilitates an in-depth understanding of GML IP protection. Furthermore, we present a systematic evaluation framework to assess the effectiveness of IP protection methods, introduce a curated set of benchmark datasets across various domains, and discuss their application scopes and future challenges. Finally, we establish an open-sourced versatile library named PyGIP, which evaluates various attack and defense techniques in GMLaaS scenarios and facilitates the implementation of existing benchmark methods. The library resource can be accessed at: https://labrai.github.io/PyGIP. We believe this survey will play a fundamental role in intellectual property protection for GML and provide practical recipes for the GML community.

The security of LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) is critically threatened by propagation vulnerability, where malicious agents can distort collective decision-making through inter-agent message interactions. While existing supervised defense methods demonstrate promising performance, they may be impractical in real-world scenarios due to their heavy reliance on labeled malicious agents to train a supervised malicious detection model. To enable practical and generalizable MAS defenses, in this paper, we propose BlindGuard, an unsupervised defense method that learns without requiring any attack-specific labels or prior knowledge of malicious behaviors. To this end, we establish a hierarchical agent encoder to capture individual, neighborhood, and global interaction patterns of each agent, providing a comprehensive understanding for malicious agent detection. Meanwhile, we design a corruption-guided detector that consists of directional noise injection and contrastive learning, allowing effective detection model training solely on normal agent behaviors. Extensive experiments show that BlindGuard effectively detects diverse attack types (i.e., prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool attack) across MAS with various communication patterns while maintaining superior generalizability compared to supervised baselines. The code is available at: https://github.com/MR9812/BlindGuard.