Logical Access (LA) attacks, also known as audio deepfake attacks, use Text-to-Speech (TTS) or Voice Conversion (VC) methods to generate spoofed speech data. This can represent a serious threat to Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) systems, as intruders can use such attacks to bypass voice biometric security. In this study, we investigate the correlation between speech quality and the performance of audio spoofing detection systems (i.e., LA task). For that, the performance of two enhancement algorithms is evaluated based on two perceptual speech quality measures, namely Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) and Speech-to-Reverberation Modulation Ratio (SRMR), and in respect to their impact on the audio spoofing detection system. We adopted the LA dataset, provided in the ASVspoof 2019 Challenge, and corrupted its test set with different Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) levels, while leaving the training data untouched. Enhancement was applied to attenuate the detrimental effects of noisy speech, and the performances of two models, Speech Enhancement Generative Adversarial Network (SEGAN) and Metric-Optimized Generative Adversarial Network Plus (MetricGAN+), were compared. Although we expect that speech quality will correlate well with speech applications' performance, it can also have as a side effect on downstream tasks if unwanted artifacts are introduced or relevant information is removed from the speech signal. Our results corroborate with this hypothesis, as we found that the enhancement algorithm leading to the highest speech quality scores, MetricGAN+, provided the lowest Equal Error Rate (EER) on the audio spoofing detection task, whereas the enhancement method with the lowest speech quality scores, SEGAN, led to the lowest EER, thus leading to better performance on the LA task.

Prompt injection attacks represent a major vulnerability in Large Language Model (LLM) deployments, where malicious instructions embedded in user inputs can override system prompts and induce unintended behaviors. This paper presents a novel multi-agent defense framework that employs specialized LLM agents in coordinated pipelines to detect and neutralize prompt injection attacks in real-time. We evaluate our approach using two distinct architectures: a sequential chain-of-agents pipeline and a hierarchical coordinator-based system. Our comprehensive evaluation on 55 unique prompt injection attacks, grouped into 8 categories and totaling 400 attack instances across two LLM platforms (ChatGLM and Llama2), demonstrates significant security improvements. Without defense mechanisms, baseline Attack Success Rates (ASR) reached 30% for ChatGLM and 20% for Llama2. Our multi-agent pipeline achieved 100% mitigation, reducing ASR to 0% across all tested scenarios. The framework demonstrates robustness across multiple attack categories including direct overrides, code execution attempts, data exfiltration, and obfuscation techniques, while maintaining system functionality for legitimate queries.