State-space models (SSMs), exemplified by the Mamba architecture, have recently emerged as state-of-the-art sequence-modeling frameworks, offering linear-time scalability together with strong performance in long-context settings. Owing to their unique combination of efficiency, scalability, and expressive capacity, SSMs have become compelling alternatives to transformer-based models, which suffer from the quadratic computational and memory costs of attention mechanisms. As SSMs are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, it is critical to assess their susceptibility to both software- and hardware-level threats to ensure secure and reliable operation. Among such threats, hardware-induced bit-flip attacks (BFAs) pose a particularly severe risk by corrupting model parameters through memory faults, thereby undermining model accuracy and functional integrity. To investigate this vulnerability, we introduce RAMBO, the first BFA framework specifically designed to target Mamba-based architectures. Through experiments on the Mamba-1.4b model with LAMBADA benchmark, a cloze-style word-prediction task, we demonstrate that flipping merely a single critical bit can catastrophically reduce accuracy from 74.64% to 0% and increase perplexity from 18.94 to 3.75 x 10^6. These results demonstrate the pronounced fragility of SSMs to adversarial perturbations.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) have emerged as a powerful paradigm for tackling complex, multi-step tasks across diverse domains. However, despite their impressive capabilities, MAS remain susceptible to adversarial manipulation. Existing studies typically examine isolated attack surfaces or specific scenarios, leaving a lack of holistic understanding of MAS vulnerabilities. To bridge this gap, we introduce PEAR, a benchmark for systematically evaluating both the utility and vulnerability of planner-executor MAS. While compatible with various MAS architectures, our benchmark focuses on the planner-executor structure, which is a practical and widely adopted design. Through extensive experiments, we find that (1) a weak planner degrades overall clean task performance more severely than a weak executor; (2) while a memory module is essential for the planner, having a memory module for the executor does not impact the clean task performance; (3) there exists a trade-off between task performance and robustness; and (4) attacks targeting the planner are particularly effective at misleading the system. These findings offer actionable insights for enhancing the robustness of MAS and lay the groundwork for principled defenses in multi-agent settings.

The integration of vision-language-action (VLA) models into embodied AI (EAI) robots is rapidly advancing their ability to perform complex, long-horizon tasks in humancentric environments. However, EAI systems introduce critical security risks: a compromised VLA model can directly translate adversarial perturbations on sensory input into unsafe physical actions. Traditional safety definitions and methodologies from the machine learning community are no longer sufficient. EAI systems raise new questions, such as what constitutes safety, how to measure it, and how to design effective attack and defense mechanisms in physically grounded, interactive settings. In this work, we present the first systematic study of adversarial safety attacks on embodied AI systems, grounded in ISO standards for human-robot interactions. We (1) formalize a principled taxonomy of safety violations (critical, dangerous, risky) based on physical constraints such as separation distance, velocity, and collision boundaries; (2) introduce ANNIEBench, a benchmark of nine safety-critical scenarios with 2,400 video-action sequences for evaluating embodied safety; and (3) ANNIE-Attack, a task-aware adversarial framework with an attack leader model that decomposes long-horizon goals into frame-level perturbations. Our evaluation across representative EAI models shows attack success rates exceeding 50% across all safety categories. We further demonstrate sparse and adaptive attack strategies and validate the real-world impact through physical robot experiments. These results expose a previously underexplored but highly consequential attack surface in embodied AI systems, highlighting the urgent need for security-driven defenses in the physical AI era. Code is available at https://github.com/RLCLab/Annie.