Generative large vision-language models (LVLMs) have recently achieved impressive performance gains, and their user base is growing rapidly. However, the security of LVLMs, in particular in a long-context multi-turn setting, is largely underexplored. In this paper, we consider the realistic scenario in which an attacker uploads a manipulated image to the web/social media. A benign user downloads this image and uses it as input to the LVLM. Our novel stealthy Visual Memory Injection (VMI) attack is designed such that on normal prompts the LVLM exhibits nominal behavior, but once the user gives a triggering prompt, the LVLM outputs a specific prescribed target message to manipulate the user, e.g. for adversarial marketing or political persuasion. Compared to previous work that focused on single-turn attacks, VMI is effective even after a long multi-turn conversation with the user. We demonstrate our attack on several recent open-weight LVLMs. This article thereby shows that large-scale manipulation of users is feasible with perturbed images in multi-turn conversation settings, calling for better robustness of LVLMs against these attacks. We release the source code at https://github.com/chs20/visual-memory-injection

We identify a novel phenomenon in language models: benign fine-tuning of frontier models can lead to privacy collapse. We find that diverse, subtle patterns in training data can degrade contextual privacy, including optimisation for helpfulness, exposure to user information, emotional and subjective dialogue, and debugging code printing internal variables, among others. Fine-tuned models lose their ability to reason about contextual privacy norms, share information inappropriately with tools, and violate memory boundaries across contexts. Privacy collapse is a ``silent failure'' because models maintain high performance on standard safety and utility benchmarks whilst exhibiting severe privacy vulnerabilities. Our experiments show evidence of privacy collapse across six models (closed and open weight), five fine-tuning datasets (real-world and controlled data), and two task categories (agentic and memory-based). Our mechanistic analysis reveals that privacy representations are uniquely fragile to fine-tuning, compared to task-relevant features which are preserved. Our results reveal a critical gap in current safety evaluations, in particular for the deployment of specialised agents.

Ensuring the safety of language models (LMs) while maintaining their usefulness remains a critical challenge in AI alignment. Current approaches rely on sequential adversarial training: generating adversarial prompts and fine-tuning LMs to defend against them. We introduce a different paradigm: framing safety alignment as a non-zero-sum game between an Attacker LM and a Defender LM trained jointly via online reinforcement learning. Each LM continuously adapts to the other's evolving strategies, driving iterative improvement. Our method uses a preference-based reward signal derived from pairwise comparisons instead of point-wise scores, providing more robust supervision and potentially reducing reward hacking. Our RL recipe, AdvGame, shifts the Pareto frontier of safety and utility, yielding a Defender LM that is simultaneously more helpful and more resilient to adversarial attacks. In addition, the resulting Attacker LM converges into a strong, general-purpose red-teaming agent that can be directly deployed to probe arbitrary target models.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-$n$ attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are crafted to be subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using them as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.