The way customers search for and choose products is changing with the rise of large language models (LLMs). LLM-based search, or generative engines, provides direct product recommendations to users, rather than traditional online search results that require users to explore options themselves. However, these recommendations are strongly influenced by the initial retrieval order of LLMs, which disadvantages small businesses and independent creators by limiting their visibility. In this work, we propose CORE, an optimization method that \textbf{C}ontrols \textbf{O}utput \textbf{R}ankings in g\textbf{E}nerative Engines for LLM-based search. Since the LLM's interactions with the search engine are black-box, CORE targets the content returned by search engines as the primary means of influencing output rankings. Specifically, CORE optimizes retrieved content by appending strategically designed optimization content to steer the ranking of outputs. We introduce three types of optimization content: string-based, reasoning-based, and review-based, demonstrating their effectiveness in shaping output rankings. To evaluate CORE in realistic settings, we introduce ProductBench, a large-scale benchmark with 15 product categories and 200 products per category, where each product is associated with its top-10 recommendations collected from Amazon's search interface. Extensive experiments on four LLMs with search capabilities (GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5, Claude-4, and Grok-3) demonstrate that CORE achieves an average Promotion Success Rate of \textbf{91.4\% @Top-5}, \textbf{86.6\% @Top-3}, and \textbf{80.3\% @Top-1}, across 15 product categories, outperforming existing ranking manipulation methods while preserving the fluency of optimized content.

Autonomous code agents built on large language models are reshaping software and AI development through tool use, long-horizon reasoning, and self-directed interaction. However, this autonomy introduces a previously unrecognized security risk: agentic interaction fundamentally expands the LLM attack surface, enabling systematic probing and recovery of hidden system prompts that guide model behavior. We identify system prompt extraction as an emergent vulnerability intrinsic to code agents and present \textbf{\textsc{JustAsk}}, a self-evolving framework that autonomously discovers effective extraction strategies through interaction alone. Unlike prior prompt-engineering or dataset-based attacks, \textsc{JustAsk} requires no handcrafted prompts, labeled supervision, or privileged access beyond standard user interaction. It formulates extraction as an online exploration problem, using Upper Confidence Bound-based strategy selection and a hierarchical skill space spanning atomic probes and high-level orchestration. These skills exploit imperfect system-instruction generalization and inherent tensions between helpfulness and safety. Evaluated on \textbf{41} black-box commercial models across multiple providers, \textsc{JustAsk} consistently achieves full or near-complete system prompt recovery, revealing recurring design- and architecture-level vulnerabilities. Our results expose system prompts as a critical yet largely unprotected attack surface in modern agent systems.

Incremental unlearning (IU) is critical for pre-trained models to comply with sequential data deletion requests, yet existing methods primarily suppress parameters or confuse knowledge without explicit constraints on both feature and gradient level, resulting in \textit{superficial forgetting} where residual information remains recoverable. This incomplete forgetting risks security breaches and disrupts retention balance, especially in IU scenarios. We propose FG-OrIU (\textbf{F}eature-\textbf{G}radient \textbf{Or}thogonality for \textbf{I}ncremental \textbf{U}nlearning), the first framework unifying orthogonal constraints on both features and gradients level to achieve deep forgetting, where the forgetting effect is irreversible. FG-OrIU decomposes feature spaces via Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), separating forgetting and remaining class features into distinct subspaces. It then enforces dual constraints: feature orthogonal projection on both forgetting and remaining classes, while gradient orthogonal projection prevents the reintroduction of forgotten knowledge and disruption to remaining classes during updates. Additionally, dynamic subspace adaptation merges newly forgetting subspaces and contracts remaining subspaces, ensuring a stable balance between removal and retention across sequential unlearning tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

Jailbreak attacks pose significant threats to large language models (LLMs), enabling attackers to bypass safeguards. However, existing reactive defense approaches struggle to keep up with the rapidly evolving multi-turn jailbreaks, where attackers continuously deepen their attacks to exploit vulnerabilities. To address this critical challenge, we propose HoneyTrap, a novel deceptive LLM defense framework leveraging collaborative defenders to counter jailbreak attacks. It integrates four defensive agents, Threat Interceptor, Misdirection Controller, Forensic Tracker, and System Harmonizer, each performing a specialized security role and collaborating to complete a deceptive defense. To ensure a comprehensive evaluation, we introduce MTJ-Pro, a challenging multi-turn progressive jailbreak dataset that combines seven advanced jailbreak strategies designed to gradually deepen attack strategies across multi-turn attacks. Besides, we present two novel metrics: Mislead Success Rate (MSR) and Attack Resource Consumption (ARC), which provide more nuanced assessments of deceptive defense beyond conventional measures. Experimental results on GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo, Gemini-1.5-pro, and LLaMa-3.1 demonstrate that HoneyTrap achieves an average reduction of 68.77% in attack success rates compared to state-of-the-art baselines. Notably, even in a dedicated adaptive attacker setting with intensified conditions, HoneyTrap remains resilient, leveraging deceptive engagement to prolong interactions, significantly increasing the time and computational costs required for successful exploitation. Unlike simple rejection, HoneyTrap strategically wastes attacker resources without impacting benign queries, improving MSR and ARC by 118.11% and 149.16%, respectively.

While most LLMs are autoregressive, diffusion-based LLMs have recently emerged as an alternative method for generation. Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attacks have proven effective against autoregressive models, but their applicability to diffusion language models remains largely unexplored. In this work, we present an exploratory study of GCG-style adversarial prompt attacks on LLaDA (Large Language Diffusion with mAsking), an open-source diffusion LLM. We evaluate multiple attack variants, including prefix perturbations and suffix-based adversarial generation, on harmful prompts drawn from the AdvBench dataset. Our study provides initial insights into the robustness and attack surface of diffusion language models and motivates the development of alternative optimization and evaluation strategies for adversarial analysis in this setting.

Influence estimation tools -- such as memorization scores -- are widely used to understand model behavior, attribute training data, and inform dataset curation. However, recent applications in data valuation and responsible machine learning raise the question: can these scores themselves be adversarially manipulated? In this work, we present a systematic study of the feasibility of attacking memorization-based influence estimators. We characterize attacks for producing highly memorized samples as highly sensitive queries in the regime where a trained algorithm is accurate. Our attack (calculating the pseudoinverse of the input) is practical, requiring only black-box access to model outputs and incur modest computational overhead. We empirically validate our attack across a wide suite of image classification tasks, showing that even state-of-the-art proxies are vulnerable to targeted score manipulations. In addition, we provide a theoretical analysis of the stability of memorization scores under adversarial perturbations, revealing conditions under which influence estimates are inherently fragile. Our findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in influence-based attribution and suggest the need for robust defenses. All code can be found at https://github.com/tuedo2/MemAttack

As Large Language Models become increasingly integral to various domains, their potential to generate harmful responses has prompted significant societal and regulatory concerns. In response, governments have issued ethics guidelines to promote the development of trustworthy AI. However, these guidelines are typically high-level demands for developers and testers, leaving a gap in translating them into actionable testing questions to verify LLM compliance. To address this challenge, we introduce GUARD (\textbf{G}uideline \textbf{U}pholding Test through \textbf{A}daptive \textbf{R}ole-play and Jailbreak \textbf{D}iagnostics), a testing method designed to operationalize guidelines into specific guideline-violating questions that assess LLM adherence. To implement this, GUARD uses automated generation of guideline-violating questions based on government-issued guidelines, thereby testing whether responses comply with these guidelines. When responses directly violate guidelines, GUARD reports inconsistencies. Furthermore, for responses that do not directly violate guidelines, GUARD integrates the concept of ``jailbreaks'' to diagnostics, named GUARD-JD, which creates scenarios that provoke unethical or guideline-violating responses, effectively identifying potential scenarios that could bypass built-in safety mechanisms. Our method finally culminates in a compliance report, delineating the extent of adherence and highlighting any violations. We have empirically validated the effectiveness of GUARD on seven LLMs, including Vicuna-13B, LongChat-7B, Llama2-7B, Llama-3-8B, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Claude-3.7, by testing compliance under three government-issued guidelines and conducting jailbreak diagnostics. Additionally, GUARD-JD can transfer jailbreak diagnostics to vision-language models, demonstrating its usage in promoting reliable LLM-based applications.