Operator learning models are rapidly emerging as the predictive core of digital twins for nuclear and energy systems, promising real-time field reconstruction from sparse sensor measurements. Yet their robustness to adversarial perturbations remains uncharacterized, a critical gap for deployment in safety-critical systems. Here we show that neural operators are acutely vulnerable to extremely sparse (fewer than 1% of inputs), physically plausible perturbations that exploit their sensitivity to boundary conditions. Using gradient-free differential evolution across four operator architectures, we demonstrate that minimal modifications trigger catastrophic prediction failures, increasing relative $L_2$ error from $\sim$1.5% (validated accuracy) to 37-63% while remaining completely undetectable by standard validation metrics. Notably, 100% of successful single-point attacks pass z-score anomaly detection. We introduce the effective perturbation dimension $d_{\text{eff}}$, a Jacobian-based diagnostic that, together with sensitivity magnitude, yields a two-factor vulnerability model explaining why architectures with extreme sensitivity concentration (POD-DeepONet, $d_{\text{eff}} \approx 1$) are not necessarily the most exploitable, since low-rank output projections cap maximum error, while moderate concentration with sufficient amplification (S-DeepONet, $d_{\text{eff}} \approx 4$) produces the highest attack success. Gradient-free search outperforms gradient-based alternatives (PGD) on architectures with gradient pathologies, while random perturbations of equal magnitude achieve near-zero success rates, confirming that the discovered vulnerabilities are structural. Our findings expose a previously overlooked attack surface in operator learning models and establish that these models require robustness guarantees beyond standard validation before deployment.

AI agents that combine large language models with non-AI system components are rapidly emerging in real-world applications, offering unprecedented automation and flexibility. However, this unprecedented flexibility introduces complex security challenges fundamentally different from those in traditional software systems. This paper presents the first systematic and comprehensive survey of AI agent security, including an analysis of the design space, attack landscape, and defense mechanisms for secure AI agent systems. We further conduct case studies to point out existing gaps in securing agentic AI systems and identify open challenges in this emerging domain. Our work also introduces the first systematic framework for understanding the security risks and defense strategies of AI agents, serving as a foundation for building both secure agentic systems and advancing research in this critical area.

Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, yet we still lack a systematic understanding of how jailbreak success scales with attacker effort across methods, model families, and harm types. We initiate a scaling-law framework for jailbreaks by treating each attack as a compute-bounded optimization procedure and measuring progress on a shared FLOPs axis. Our systematic evaluation spans four representative jailbreak paradigms, covering optimization-based attacks, self-refinement prompting, sampling-based selection, and genetic optimization, across multiple model families and scales on a diverse set of harmful goals. We investigate scaling laws that relate attacker budget to attack success score by fitting a simple saturating exponential function to FLOPs--success trajectories, and we derive comparable efficiency summaries from the fitted curves. Empirically, prompting-based paradigms tend to be the most compute-efficient compared to optimization-based methods. To explain this gap, we cast prompt-based updates into an optimization view and show via a same-state comparison that prompt-based attacks more effectively optimize in prompt space. We also show that attacks occupy distinct success--stealthiness operating points with prompting-based methods occupying the high-success, high-stealth region. Finally, we find that vulnerability is strongly goal-dependent: harms involving misinformation are typically easier to elicit than other non-misinformation harms.

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly capable, yet their safety lags behind. This creates a gap between what agents can do and should do. This gap widens as agents engage in multi-turn interactions and employ diverse tools, introducing new risks overlooked by existing benchmarks. To systematically scale safety testing into multi-turn, tool-realistic settings, we propose a principled taxonomy that transforms single-turn harmful tasks into multi-turn attack sequences. Using this taxonomy, we construct MT-AgentRisk (Multi-Turn Agent Risk Benchmark), the first benchmark to evaluate multi-turn tool-using agent safety. Our experiments reveal substantial safety degradation: the Attack Success Rate (ASR) increases by 16% on average across open and closed models in multi-turn settings. To close this gap, we propose ToolShield, a training-free, tool-agnostic, self-exploration defense: when encountering a new tool, the agent autonomously generates test cases, executes them to observe downstream effects, and distills safety experiences for deployment. Experiments show that ToolShield effectively reduces ASR by 30% on average in multi-turn interactions. Our code is available at https://github.com/CHATS-lab/ToolShield.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from $0.29 \pm 0.04$ (LangGraph) to $0.51 \pm 0.07$ (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet ($0.62 \pm 0.08$), Authorization Confusion ($0.54 \pm 0.10$), Retrieval Poisoning ($0.47 \pm 0.09$), and Planning Manipulation ($0.44 \pm 0.11$), while prompt-centric classes remain below $0.20$ under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking ($ρ\approx 0.63$ and $ρ\approx 0.58$). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.

Neural networks achieve strong empirical performance, but robustness concerns still hinder deployment in safety-critical applications. Formal verification provides robustness guarantees, but current methods face a scalability-completeness trade-off. We propose a hybrid verifier in a branch-and-bound (BaB) framework that efficiently tightens both upper and lower bounds until an $ε-$global optimum is reached or early stop is triggered. The key is an exact nonlinear program with complementarity constraints (NLP-CC) for upper bounding that preserves the ReLU input-output graph, so any feasible solution yields a valid counterexample and enables rapid pruning of unsafe subproblems. We further accelerate verification with (i) warm-started NLP solves requiring minimal constraint-matrix updates and (ii) pattern-aligned strong branching that prioritizes splits most effective at tightening relaxations. We also provide conditions under which NLP-CC upper bounds are tight. Experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 show markedly tighter upper bounds than PGD across perturbation radii spanning up to three orders of magnitude, fast per-node solves in practice, and substantial end-to-end speedups over MIP-based verification, amplified by warm-starting, GPU batching, and pattern-aligned branching.

Large audio-language models increasingly operate on raw speech inputs, enabling more seamless integration across domains such as voice assistants, education, and clinical triage. This transition, however, introduces a distinct class of vulnerabilities that remain largely uncharacterized. We examine the security implications of this modality shift by designing a text-to-audio jailbreak that embeds disallowed directives within a narrative-style audio stream. The attack leverages an advanced instruction-following text-to-speech (TTS) model to exploit structural and acoustic properties, thereby circumventing safety mechanisms primarily calibrated for text. When delivered through synthetic speech, the narrative format elicits restricted outputs from state-of-the-art models, including Gemini 2.0 Flash, achieving a 98.26% success rate that substantially exceeds text-only baselines. These results highlight the need for safety frameworks that jointly reason over linguistic and paralinguistic representations, particularly as speech-based interfaces become more prevalent.

Stealing attacks pose a persistent threat to the intellectual property of deployed machine-learning systems. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) intensifies this risk by extending the attack surface beyond model weights to knowledge base that often contains IP-bearing assets such as proprietary runbooks, curated domain collections, or licensed documents. Recent work shows that multi-turn questioning can gradually steal corpus content from RAG systems, yet existing attacks are largely heuristic and often plateau early. We address this gap by formulating RAG knowledge-base stealing as an adaptive stochastic coverage problem (ASCP), where each query is a stochastic action and the goal is to maximize the conditional expected marginal gain (CMG) in corpus coverage under a query budget. Bridging ASCP to real-world black-box RAG knowledge-base stealing raises three challenges: CMG is unobservable, the natural-language action space is intractably large, and feasibility constraints require stealthy queries that remain effective under diverse architectures. We introduce RAGCrawler, a knowledge graph-guided attacker that maintains a global attacker-side state to estimate coverage gains, schedule high-value semantic anchors, and generate non-redundant natural queries. Across four corpora and four generators with BGE retriever, RAGCrawler achieves 66.8% average coverage (up to 84.4%) within 1,000 queries, improving coverage by 44.90% relative to the strongest baseline. It also reduces the queries needed to reach 70% coverage by at least 4.03x on average and enables surrogate reconstruction with answer similarity up to 0.699. Our attack is also scalable to retriever switching and newer RAG techniques like query rewriting and multi-query retrieval. These results highlight urgent needs to protect RAG knowledge assets.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judges to evaluate agent performance, particularly in non-verifiable settings where judgments rely on agent trajectories including chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. This paradigm implicitly assumes that the agent's CoT faithfully reflects both its internal reasoning and the underlying environment state. We show this assumption is brittle: LLM judges are highly susceptible to manipulation of agent reasoning traces. By systematically rewriting agent CoTs while holding actions and observations fixed, we demonstrate that manipulated reasoning alone can inflate false positive rates of state-of-the-art VLM judges by up to 90% across 800 trajectories spanning diverse web tasks. We study manipulation strategies spanning style-based approaches that alter only the presentation of reasoning and content-based approaches that fabricate signals of task progress, and find that content-based manipulations are consistently more effective. We evaluate prompting-based techniques and scaling judge-time compute, which reduce but do not fully eliminate susceptibility to manipulation. Our findings reveal a fundamental vulnerability in LLM-based evaluation and highlight the need for judging mechanisms that verify reasoning claims against observable evidence.

Formal verification of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) is essential for safety-critical applications, ranging from surgical robotics to NASA JPL autonomous systems. However, the computational cost of verifying large-scale models remains a significant barrier to adoption. This paper investigates the impact of pruning on formal local robustness certificates with different ratios. Using the state-of-the-art $α,β$-CROWN verifier, we evaluate ResNet4 models across varying pruning ratios on MNIST and, more importantly, on the NASA JPL Mars Frost Identification datasets. Our findings demonstrate a non-linear relationship: light pruning (40%) in MNIST and heavy pruning (70%-90%) in JPL improve verifiability, allowing models to outperform unpruned baselines in proven $L_\infty$ robustness properties. This suggests that reduced connectivity simplifies the search space for formal solvers and that the optimal pruning ratio varies significantly between datasets. This research highlights the complex nature of model compression, offering critical insights into selecting the optimal pruning ratio for deploying efficient, yet formally verified, DNNs in high-stakes environments where reliability is non-negotiable.

The agent-tool communication loop is a critical attack surface in modern Large Language Model (LLM) agents. Existing Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, primarily triggered via user prompts or injected retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) context, are ineffective for this new paradigm. They are fundamentally single-turn and often lack a task-oriented approach, making them conspicuous in goal-oriented workflows and unable to exploit the compounding costs of multi-turn agent-tool interactions. We introduce a stealthy, multi-turn economic DoS attack that operates at the tool layer under the guise of a correctly completed task. Our method adjusts text-visible fields and a template-governed return policy in a benign, Model Context Protocol (MCP)-compatible tool server, optimizing these edits with a Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) optimizer. These adjustments leave function signatures unchanged and preserve the final payload, steering the agent into prolonged, verbose tool-calling sequences using text-only notices. This compounds costs across turns, escaping single-turn caps while keeping the final answer correct to evade validation. Across six LLMs on the ToolBench and BFCL benchmarks, our attack expands tasks into trajectories exceeding 60,000 tokens, inflates costs by up to 658x, and raises energy by 100-560x. It drives GPU KV cache occupancy from <1% to 35-74% and cuts co-running throughput by approximately 50%. Because the server remains protocol-compatible and task outcomes are correct, conventional checks fail. These results elevate the agent-tool interface to a first-class security frontier, demanding a paradigm shift from validating final answers to monitoring the economic and computational cost of the entire agentic process.

Despite rich safety alignment strategies, large language models (LLMs) remain highly susceptible to jailbreak attacks, which compromise safety guardrails and pose serious security risks. Existing detection methods mainly detect jailbreak status relying on jailbreak templates present in the training data. However, few studies address the more realistic and challenging zero-shot jailbreak detection setting, where no jailbreak templates are available during training. This setting better reflects real-world scenarios where new attacks continually emerge and evolve. To address this challenge, we propose a layer-wise, module-wise, and token-wise amplification framework that progressively magnifies internal feature discrepancies between benign and jailbreak prompts. We uncover safety-relevant layers, identify specific modules that inherently encode zero-shot discriminative signals, and localize informative safety tokens. Building upon these insights, we introduce ALERT (Amplification-based Jailbreak Detector), an efficient and effective zero-shot jailbreak detector that introduces two independent yet complementary classifiers on amplified representations. Extensive experiments on three safety benchmarks demonstrate that ALERT achieves consistently strong zero-shot detection performance. Specifically, (i) across all datasets and attack strategies, ALERT reliably ranks among the top two methods, and (ii) it outperforms the second-best baseline by at least 10% in average Accuracy and F1-score, and sometimes by up to 40%.

Most jailbreak methods achieve high attack success rates (ASR) but require attacker LLMs to craft adversarial queries and/or demand high query budgets. These resource limitations make jailbreaking expensive, and the queries generated by attacker LLMs often consist of non-interpretable random prefixes. This paper introduces Lexical Anchor Tree Search (), addressing these limitations through an attacker-LLM-free method that operates purely via lexical anchor injection. LATS reformulates jailbreaking as a breadth-first tree search over multi-turn dialogues, where each node incrementally injects missing content words from the attack goal into benign prompts. Evaluations on AdvBench and HarmBench demonstrate that LATS achieves 97-100% ASR on latest GPT, Claude, and Llama models with an average of only ~6.4 queries, compared to 20+ queries required by other methods. These results highlight conversational structure as a potent and under-protected attack surface, while demonstrating superior query efficiency in an era where high ASR is readily achievable. Our code will be released to support reproducibility.

Recent advancements in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have shown groundbreaking capabilities across diverse multimodal tasks. However, these models remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks, where adversaries craft subtle perturbations to bypass safety mechanisms and trigger harmful outputs. Existing white-box attacks methods require full model accessibility, suffer from computing costs and exhibit insufficient adversarial transferability, making them impractical for real-world, black-box settings. To address these limitations, we propose a black-box jailbreak attack on LVLMs via Zeroth-Order optimization using Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (ZO-SPSA). ZO-SPSA provides three key advantages: (i) gradient-free approximation by input-output interactions without requiring model knowledge, (ii) model-agnostic optimization without the surrogate model and (iii) lower resource requirements with reduced GPU memory consumption. We evaluate ZO-SPSA on three LVLMs, including InstructBLIP, LLaVA and MiniGPT-4, achieving the highest jailbreak success rate of 83.0% on InstructBLIP, while maintaining imperceptible perturbations comparable to white-box methods. Moreover, adversarial examples generated from MiniGPT-4 exhibit strong transferability to other LVLMs, with ASR reaching 64.18%. These findings underscore the real-world feasibility of black-box jailbreaks and expose critical weaknesses in the safety mechanisms of current LVLMs

AI-for-Code (AI4Code) systems are reshaping software engineering, with tools like GitHub Copilot accelerating code generation, translation, and vulnerability detection. Alongside these advances, however, security risks remain pervasive: insecure outputs, biased benchmarks, and susceptibility to adversarial manipulation undermine their reliability. This SoK surveys the landscape of AI4Code security across three core applications, identifying recurring gaps: benchmark dominance by Python and toy problems, lack of standardized security datasets, data leakage in evaluation, and fragile adversarial robustness. A comparative study of six state-of-the-art models illustrates these challenges: insecure patterns persist in code generation, vulnerability detection is brittle to semantic-preserving attacks, fine-tuning often misaligns security objectives, and code translation yields uneven security benefits. From this analysis, we distill three forward paths: embedding secure-by-default practices in code generation, building robust and comprehensive detection benchmarks, and leveraging translation as a route to security-enhanced languages. We call for a shift toward security-first AI4Code, where vulnerability mitigation and robustness are embedded throughout the development life cycle.

State-of-the-art neural network (NN) verifiers demonstrate that applying the branch-and-bound (BaB) procedure with fast bounding techniques plays a key role in tackling many challenging verification properties. In this work, we introduce the linear constraint-driven clipping framework, a class of scalable and efficient methods designed to enhance the efficacy of NN verifiers. Under this framework, we develop two novel algorithms that efficiently utilize linear constraints to 1) reduce portions of the input space that are either verified or irrelevant to a subproblem in the context of branch-and-bound, and 2) directly improve intermediate bounds throughout the network. The process novelly leverages linear constraints that often arise from bound propagation methods and is general enough to also incorporate constraints from other sources. It efficiently handles linear constraints using a specialized GPU procedure that can scale to large neural networks without the use of expensive external solvers. Our verification procedure, Clip-and-Verify, consistently tightens bounds across multiple benchmarks and can significantly reduce the number of subproblems handled during BaB. We show that our clipping algorithms can be integrated with BaB-based verifiers such as $α,β$-CROWN, utilizing either the split constraints in activation-space BaB or the output constraints that denote the unverified input space. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our procedure on a broad range of benchmarks where, in some instances, we witness a 96% reduction in the number of subproblems during branch-and-bound, and also achieve state-of-the-art verified accuracy across multiple benchmarks. Clip-and-Verify is part of the $α,β$-CROWN verifier (http://abcrown.org), the VNN-COMP 2025 winner. Code available at https://github.com/Verified-Intelligence/Clip_and_Verify.

Large language models (LLMs) face critical safety challenges, as they can be manipulated to generate harmful content through adversarial prompts and jailbreak attacks. Many defenses are typically either black-box guardrails that filter outputs, or internals-based methods that steer hidden activations by operationalizing safety as a single latent feature or dimension. While effective for simple concepts, this assumption is limiting, as recent evidence shows that abstract concepts such as refusal and temporality are distributed across multiple features rather than isolated in one. To address this limitation, we introduce Graph-Regularized Sparse Autoencoders (GSAEs), which extends SAEs with a Laplacian smoothness penalty on the neuron co-activation graph. Unlike standard SAEs that assign each concept to a single latent feature, GSAEs recover smooth, distributed safety representations as coherent patterns spanning multiple features. We empirically demonstrate that GSAE enables effective runtime safety steering, assembling features into a weighted set of safety-relevant directions and controlling them with a two-stage gating mechanism that activates interventions only when harmful prompts or continuations are detected during generation. This approach enforces refusals adaptively while preserving utility on benign queries. Across safety and QA benchmarks, GSAE steering achieves an average 82% selective refusal rate, substantially outperforming standard SAE steering (42%), while maintaining strong task accuracy (70% on TriviaQA, 65% on TruthfulQA, 74% on GSM8K). Robustness experiments further show generalization across LLaMA-3, Mistral, Qwen, and Phi families and resilience against jailbreak attacks (GCG, AutoDAN), consistently maintaining >= 90% refusal of harmful content.

We propose new methodologies for both unlearning random set of samples and class unlearning and show that they outperform existing methods. The main driver of our unlearning methods is the similarity of predictions to a retrained model on both the forget and remain samples. We introduce Adversarial Machine UNlearning (AMUN), which surpasses prior state-of-the-art methods for image classification based on SOTA MIA scores. AMUN lowers the model's confidence on forget samples by fine-tuning on their corresponding adversarial examples. Through theoretical analysis, we identify factors governing AMUN's performance, including smoothness. To facilitate training of smooth models with a controlled Lipschitz constant, we propose FastClip, a scalable method that performs layer-wise spectral-norm clipping of affine layers. In a separate study, we show that increased smoothness naturally improves adversarial example transfer, thereby supporting the second factor above. Following the same principles for class unlearning, we show that existing methods fail in replicating a retrained model's behavior by introducing a nearest-neighbor membership inference attack (MIA-NN) that uses the probabilities assigned to neighboring classes to detect unlearned samples and demonstrate the vulnerability of such methods. We then propose a fine-tuning objective that mitigates this leakage by approximating, for forget-class inputs, the distribution over remaining classes that a model retrained from scratch would produce. To construct this approximation, we estimate inter-class similarity and tilt the target model's distribution accordingly. The resulting Tilted ReWeighting(TRW) distribution serves as the desired target during fine-tuning. Across multiple benchmarks, TRW matches or surpasses existing unlearning methods on prior metrics.

Deep residual networks (ResNets) have demonstrated outstanding success in computer vision tasks, attributed to their ability to maintain gradient flow through deep architectures. Simultaneously, controlling the Lipschitz constant in neural networks has emerged as an essential area of research to enhance adversarial robustness and network certifiability. This paper presents a rigorous approach to the general design of $\mathcal{L}$-Lipschitz deep residual networks using a Linear Matrix Inequality (LMI) framework. Initially, the ResNet architecture was reformulated as a cyclic tridiagonal LMI, and closed-form constraints on network parameters were derived to ensure $\mathcal{L}$-Lipschitz continuity; however, using a new $LDL^\top$ decomposition approach for certifying LMI feasibility, we extend the construction of $\mathcal{L}$-Lipchitz networks to any other nonlinear architecture. Our contributions include a provable parameterization methodology for constructing Lipschitz-constrained residual networks and other hierarchical architectures. Cholesky decomposition is also used for efficient parameterization. These findings enable robust network designs applicable to adversarial robustness, certified training, and control systems. The $LDL^\top$ formulation is shown to be a tight relaxation of the SDP-based network, maintaining full expressiveness and achieving 3\%-13\% accuracy gains over SLL Layers on 121 UCI data sets.

A frustratingly easy technique known as the prefilling attack has been shown to effectively circumvent the safety alignment of frontier LLMs by simply prefilling the assistant response with an affirmative prefix before decoding. In response, recent work proposed a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) defense using data augmentation to achieve a \enquote{deep} safety alignment, allowing the model to generate natural language refusals immediately following harmful prefills. Unfortunately, we show in this work that the "deep" safety alignment produced by such an approach is in fact not very deep. A generalization of the prefilling attack, which we refer to as the Rank-Assisted Prefilling (RAP) attack, can effectively extract harmful content from models fine-tuned with the data augmentation defense by selecting low-probability "harmful" tokens from the top 20 predicted next tokens at each step (thus ignoring high-probability "refusal" tokens). We argue that this vulnerability is enabled due to the "gaming" of the SFT objective when the target distribution entropies are low, where low fine-tuning loss is achieved by shifting large probability mass to a small number of refusal tokens while neglecting the high ranks of harmful tokens. We then propose a new perspective on achieving deep safety alignment by matching the token ranks of the target distribution, rather than their probabilities. This perspective yields a surprisingly simple fix to the data augmentation defense based on regularizing the attention placed on harmful prefill tokens, an approach we call PRefill attEntion STOpping (PRESTO). Adding PRESTO yields up to a 4.7x improvement in the mean StrongREJECT score under RAP attacks across three popular open-source LLMs, with low impact to model utility.