LLM agent frameworks increasingly offer checkpoint-restore for error recovery and exploration, advising developers to make external tool calls safe to retry. This advice assumes that a retried call will be identical to the original, an assumption that holds for traditional programs but fails for LLM agents, which re-synthesize subtly different requests after restore. Servers treat these re-generated requests as new, enabling duplicate payments, unauthorized reuse of consumed credentials, and other irreversible side effects; we term these semantic rollback attacks. We identify two attack classes, Action Replay and Authority Resurrection, validate them in a proof of concept experiment, and confirm that the problem has been independently acknowledged by framework maintainers. We propose ACRFence, a framework-agnostic mitigation that records irreversible tool effects and enforces replay-or-fork semantics upon restoration

Graph neural network (GNN) is a powerful tool for analyzing graph-structured data. However, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks raises serious concerns, especially when dealing with sensitive information. Local Differential Privacy (LDP) offers a privacy-preserving framework for training GNNs, but its impact on adversarial robustness remains underexplored. This paper investigates adversarial attacks on LDP-protected GNNs. We explore how the privacy guarantees of LDP can be leveraged or hindered by adversarial perturbations. The effectiveness of existing attack methods on LDP-protected GNNs are analyzed and potential challenges in crafting adversarial examples under LDP constraints are discussed. Additionally, we suggest directions for defending LDP-protected GNNs against adversarial attacks. This work investigates the interplay between privacy and security in graph learning, highlighting the need for robust and privacy-preserving GNN architectures.

Code generation large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into modern software development workflows. Recent work has shown that these models are vulnerable to backdoor and poisoning attacks that induce the generation of insecure code, yet effective defenses remain limited. Existing scanning approaches rely on token-level generation consistency to invert attack targets, which is ineffective for source code where identical semantics can appear in diverse syntactic forms. We present CodeScan, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first poisoning-scanning framework tailored to code generation models. CodeScan identifies attack targets by analyzing structural similarities across multiple generations conditioned on different clean prompts. It combines iterative divergence analysis with abstract syntax tree (AST)-based normalization to abstract away surface-level variation and unify semantically equivalent code, isolating structures that recur consistently across generations. CodeScan then applies LLM-based vulnerability analysis to determine whether the extracted structures contain security vulnerabilities and flags the model as compromised when such a structure is found. We evaluate CodeScan against four representative attacks under both backdoor and poisoning settings across three real-world vulnerability classes. Experiments on 108 models spanning three architectures and multiple model sizes demonstrate 97%+ detection accuracy with substantially lower false positives than prior methods.

Developments in the machine learning voting domain have shown both promising results and risks. Trained models perform well on ballot classification tasks (> 99% accuracy) but are at risk from adversarial example attacks that cause misclassifications. In this paper, we analyze an attacker who seeks to deploy adversarial examples against machine learning ballot classifiers to compromise a U.S. election. We first derive a probabilistic framework for determining the number of adversarial example ballots that must be printed to flip an election, in terms of the probability of each candidate winning and the total number of ballots cast. Second, it is an open question as to which type of adversarial example is most effective when physically printed in the voting domain. We analyze six different types of adversarial example attacks: l_infinity-APGD, l2-APGD, l1-APGD, l0 PGD, l0 + l_infinity PGD, and l0 + sigma-map PGD. Our experiments include physical realizations of 144,000 adversarial examples through printing and scanning with four different machine learning models. We empirically demonstrate an analysis gap between the physical and digital domains, wherein attacks most effective in the digital domain (l2 and l_infinity) differ from those most effective in the physical domain (l1 and l2, depending on the model). By unifying a probabilistic election framework with digital and physical adversarial example evaluations, we move beyond prior close race analyses to explicitly quantify when and how adversarial ballot manipulation could alter outcomes.

Randomized smoothing has become essential for achieving certified adversarial robustness in machine learning models. However, current methods primarily use isotropic noise distributions that are uniform across all data dimensions, such as image pixels, limiting the effectiveness of robustness certification by ignoring the heterogeneity of inputs and data dimensions. To address this limitation, we propose UCAN: a novel technique that \underline{U}niversally \underline{C}ertifies adversarial robustness with \underline{A}nisotropic \underline{N}oise. UCAN is designed to enhance any existing randomized smoothing method, transforming it from symmetric (isotropic) to asymmetric (anisotropic) noise distributions, thereby offering a more tailored defense against adversarial attacks. Our theoretical framework is versatile, supporting a wide array of noise distributions for certified robustness in different $\ell_p$-norms and applicable to any arbitrary classifier by guaranteeing the classifier's prediction over perturbed inputs with provable robustness bounds through tailored noise injection. Additionally, we develop a novel framework equipped with three exemplary noise parameter generators (NPGs) to optimally fine-tune the anisotropic noise parameters for different data dimensions, allowing for pursuing different levels of robustness enhancements in practice.Empirical evaluations underscore the significant leap in UCAN's performance over existing state-of-the-art methods, demonstrating up to $182.6\%$ improvement in certified accuracy at large certified radii on MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet datasets.\footnote{Code is anonymously available at \href{https://github.com/youbin2014/UCAN/}{https://github.com/youbin2014/UCAN/}}

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly become integral to real-world applications, powering services across diverse sectors. However, their widespread deployment has exposed critical security risks, particularly through jailbreak prompts that can bypass model alignment and induce harmful outputs. Despite intense research into both attack and defense techniques, the field remains fragmented: definitions, threat models, and evaluation criteria vary widely, impeding systematic progress and fair comparison. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK), we address these challenges by (1) proposing a holistic, multi-level taxonomy that organizes attacks, defenses, and vulnerabilities in LLM prompt security; (2) formalizing threat models and cost assumptions into machine-readable profiles for reproducible evaluation; (3) introducing an open-source evaluation toolkit for standardized, auditable comparison of attacks and defenses; (4) releasing JAILBREAKDB, the largest annotated dataset of jailbreak and benign prompts to date;\footnote{The dataset is released at \href{https://huggingface.co/datasets/youbin2014/JailbreakDB}{\textcolor{purple}{https://huggingface.co/datasets/youbin2014/JailbreakDB}}.} and (5) presenting a comprehensive evaluation platform and leaderboard of state-of-the-art methods \footnote{will be released soon.}. Our work unifies fragmented research, provides rigorous foundations for future studies, and supports the development of robust, trustworthy LLMs suitable for high-stakes deployment.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have emerged as powerful models for learning from graph-structured data. However, their widespread adoption has raised serious privacy concerns. While prior research has primarily focused on edge-level privacy, a critical yet underexplored threat lies in topology privacy - the confidentiality of the graph's overall structure. In this work, we present a comprehensive study on topology privacy risks in GNNs, revealing their vulnerability to graph-level inference attacks. To this end, we propose a suite of Topology Inference Attacks (TIAs) that can reconstruct the structure of a target training graph using only black-box access to a GNN model. Our findings show that GNNs are highly susceptible to these attacks, and that existing edge-level differential privacy mechanisms are insufficient as they either fail to mitigate the risk or severely compromise model accuracy. To address this challenge, we introduce Private Graph Reconstruction (PGR), a novel defense framework designed to protect topology privacy while maintaining model accuracy. PGR is formulated as a bi-level optimization problem, where a synthetic training graph is iteratively generated using meta-gradients, and the GNN model is concurrently updated based on the evolving graph. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PGR significantly reduces topology leakage with minimal impact on model accuracy. Our code is available at https://github.com/JeffffffFu/PGR.

Global KV-cache sharing is an effective optimization for accelerating large language model (LLM) inference, yet it introduces an API-visible timing side channel that lets adversaries infer sensitive user inputs from shared entries, leading to cross-tenant privacy risks. To address this problem, we introduce SafeKV (Secure and Flexible KV-cache Sharing), a system-level co-design of privacy enforcement and KV-cache management. SafeKV integrates lightweight detection and isolation directly into the serving runtime to eliminate cross-tenant reuse of sensitive KV-cache blocks under our threat model, while recovering most of the performance benefits of global sharing. Our key contributions are: (1) a three-tier asynchronous detection pipeline that decouples privacy classification from inference and supports streaming workloads, (2) a unified radix-tree-based memory manager with path compression and sensitivity-aware eviction for scalable selective isolation, and (3) an RDR-guided (Reuse Diversity Ratio) runtime safeguard that detects and bounds residual leakage. On large LLM backends, SafeKV reduces the time-to-first-token (TTFT) overhead compared to full isolation by up to 40.58% and raises throughput by up to 2.66x. Overall, SafeKV restores the efficiency of KV reuse while enforcing strong, practical privacy for multi-tenant LLM inference.

Text-to-image diffusion models (T2I DMs) have achieved remarkable success in generating high-quality and diverse images from text prompts, yet recent studies have revealed their vulnerability to backdoor attacks. Existing attack methods suffer from critical limitations: 1) they rely on unnatural adversarial prompts that lack human readability and require massive poisoned data; 2) their effectiveness is typically restricted to specific models, lacking generalizability; and 3) they can be mitigated by recent backdoor defenses. To overcome these challenges, we propose a novel backdoor attack framework that achieves three key properties: 1) \emph{Practicality}: Our attack requires only a few stealthy backdoor samples to generate arbitrary attacker-chosen target images, as well as ensuring high-quality image generation in benign scenarios. 2) \emph{Generalizability:} The attack is applicable across multiple T2I DMs without requiring model-specific redesign. 3) \emph{Robustness:} The attack remains effective against existing backdoor defenses and adaptive defenses. Our extensive experimental results on multiple T2I DMs demonstrate that with only 10 carefully crafted backdoored samples, our attack method achieves $>$90\% attack success rate with negligible degradation in benign image generation quality. We also conduct human evaluation to validate our attack effectiveness. Furthermore, recent backdoor detection and mitigation methods, as well as adaptive defense tailored to our attack are not sufficiently effective, highlighting the pressing need for more robust defense mechanisms against the proposed attack.

Membership inference attacks have emerged as a significant privacy concern in the training of deep learning models, where attackers can infer whether a data point was part of the training set based on the model's outputs. To address this challenge, we propose a novel defense mechanism, AdaMixup. AdaMixup employs adaptive mixup techniques to enhance the model's robustness against membership inference attacks by dynamically adjusting the mixup strategy during training. This method not only improves the model's privacy protection but also maintains high performance. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that AdaMixup significantly reduces the risk of membership inference attacks while achieving a favorable trade-off between defensive efficiency and model accuracy. This research provides an effective solution for data privacy protection and lays the groundwork for future advancements in mixup training methods.