Object detection models are critical components of automated systems, such as autonomous vehicles and perception-based robots, but their sensitivity to adversarial attacks poses a serious security risk. Progress in defending these models lags behind classification, hindered by a lack of standardized evaluation. It is nearly impossible to thoroughly compare attack or defense methods, as existing work uses different datasets, inconsistent efficiency metrics, and varied measures of perturbation cost. This paper addresses this gap by investigating three key questions: (1) How can we create a fair benchmark to impartially compare attacks? (2) How well do modern attacks transfer across different architectures, especially from Convolutional Neural Networks to Vision Transformers? (3) What is the most effective adversarial training strategy for robust defense? To answer these, we first propose a unified benchmark framework focused on digital, non-patch-based attacks. This framework introduces specific metrics to disentangle localization and classification errors and evaluates attack cost using multiple perceptual metrics. Using this benchmark, we conduct extensive experiments on state-of-the-art attacks and a wide range of detectors. Our findings reveal two major conclusions: first, modern adversarial attacks against object detection models show a significant lack of transferability to transformer-based architectures. Second, we demonstrate that the most robust adversarial training strategy leverages a dataset composed of a mix of high-perturbation attacks with different objectives (e.g., spatial and semantic), which outperforms training on any single attack.

Modern deep learning-based inpainting enables realistic local image manipulation, raising critical challenges for reliable detection. However, we observe that current detectors primarily rely on global artifacts that appear as inpainting side effects, rather than on locally synthesized content. We show that this behavior occurs because VAE-based reconstruction induces a subtle but pervasive spectral shift across the entire image, including unedited regions. To isolate this effect, we introduce Inpainting Exchange (INP-X), an operation that restores original pixels outside the edited region while preserving all synthesized content. We create a 90K test dataset including real, inpainted, and exchanged images to evaluate this phenomenon. Under this intervention, pretrained state-of-the-art detectors, including commercial ones, exhibit a dramatic drop in accuracy (e.g., from 91\% to 55\%), frequently approaching chance level. We provide a theoretical analysis linking this behavior to high-frequency attenuation caused by VAE information bottlenecks. Our findings highlight the need for content-aware detection. Indeed, training on our dataset yields better generalization and localization than standard inpainting. Our dataset and code are publicly available at https://github.com/emirhanbilgic/INP-X.

Deep generative models are often trained on sensitive data, such as genetic sequences, health data, or more broadly, any copyrighted, licensed or protected content. This raises critical concerns around privacy-preserving synthetic data, and more specifically around privacy leakage, an issue closely tied to overfitting. Existing methods almost exclusively rely on global criteria to estimate the risk of privacy failure associated to a model, offering only quantitative non interpretable insights. The absence of rigorous evaluation methods for data privacy at the sample-level may hinder the practical deployment of synthetic data in real-world applications. Using extreme value statistics on nearest-neighbor distances, we propose PRIVET, a generic sample-based, modality-agnostic algorithm that assigns an individual privacy leak score to each synthetic sample. We empirically demonstrate that PRIVET reliably detects instances of memorization and privacy leakage across diverse data modalities, including settings with very high dimensionality, limited sample sizes such as genetic data and even under underfitting regimes. We compare our method to existing approaches under controlled settings and show its advantage in providing both dataset level and sample level assessments through qualitative and quantitative outputs. Additionally, our analysis reveals limitations in existing computer vision embeddings to yield perceptually meaningful distances when identifying near-duplicate samples.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) gain traction across critical domains, ensuring secure and trustworthy training processes has become a major concern. Backdoor attacks, where malicious actors inject hidden triggers into training data, are particularly insidious and difficult to detect. Existing post-training verification solutions like Proof-of-Learning are impractical for LLMs due to their requirement for full retraining, lack of robustness against stealthy manipulations, and inability to provide early detection during training. Early detection would significantly reduce computational costs. To address these limitations, we introduce Proof-of-Training Steps, a verification protocol that enables an independent auditor (Alice) to confirm that an LLM developer (Bob) has followed the declared training recipe, including data batches, architecture, and hyperparameters. By analyzing the sensitivity of the LLMs' language modeling head (LM-Head) to input perturbations, our method can expose subtle backdoor injections or deviations in training. Even with backdoor triggers in up to 10 percent of the training data, our protocol significantly reduces the attacker's ability to achieve a high attack success rate (ASR). Our method enables early detection of attacks at the injection step, with verification steps being 3x faster than training steps. Our results highlight the protocol's potential to enhance the accountability and security of LLM development, especially against insider threats.

We propose a system for marking sensitive or copyrighted texts to detect their use in fine-tuning large language models under black-box access with statistical guarantees. Our method builds digital ``marks'' using invisible Unicode characters organized into (``cue'', ``reply'') pairs. During an audit, prompts containing only ``cue'' fragments are issued to trigger regurgitation of the corresponding ``reply'', indicating document usage. To control false positives, we compare against held-out counterfactual marks and apply a ranking test, yielding a verifiable bound on the false positive rate. The approach is minimally invasive, scalable across many sources, robust to standard processing pipelines, and achieves high detection power even when marked data is a small fraction of the fine-tuning corpus.

Large Language Models have found success in a variety of applications. However, their safety remains a concern due to the existence of various jailbreaking methods. Despite significant efforts, alignment and safety fine-tuning only provide a certain degree of robustness against jailbreak attacks that covertly mislead LLMs towards the generation of harmful content. This leaves them prone to a range of vulnerabilities, including targeted misuse and accidental user profiling. This work introduces \textbf{ConceptGuard}, a novel framework that leverages Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to identify interpretable concepts within LLM internals associated with different jailbreak themes. By extracting semantically meaningful internal representations, ConceptGuard enables building robust safety guardrails -- offering fully explainable and generalizable defenses without sacrificing model capabilities or requiring further fine-tuning. Leveraging advances in the mechanistic interpretability of LLMs, our approach provides evidence for a shared activation geometry for jailbreak attacks in the representation space, a potential foundation for designing more interpretable and generalizable safeguards against attackers.