Diffusion models enable high-fidelity image editing but can also be misused for unauthorized style imitation and harmful content generation. To mitigate these risks, proactive image protection methods embed small, often imperceptible adversarial perturbations into images before sharing to disrupt downstream editing or fine-tuning. However, in realistic post-release scenarios, content owners cannot control downstream processing pipelines, and protections optimized for a surrogate model may fail when attackers use mismatched diffusion pipelines. Existing purification methods can weaken protections but often sacrifice image quality and rarely examine architectural mismatch. We introduce a unified post-release purification framework to evaluate protection survivability under model mismatch. We propose two practical purifiers: VAE-Trans, which corrects protected images via latent-space projection, and EditorClean, which performs instruction-guided reconstruction with a Diffusion Transformer to exploit architectural heterogeneity. Both operate without access to protected images or defense internals. Across 2,100 editing tasks and six representative protection methods, EditorClean consistently restores editability. Compared to protected inputs, it improves PSNR by 3-6 dB and reduces FID by 50-70 percent on downstream edits, while outperforming prior purification baselines by about 2 dB PSNR and 30 percent lower FID. Our results reveal a purify-once, edit-freely failure mode: once purification succeeds, the protective signal is largely removed, enabling unrestricted editing. This highlights the need to evaluate protections under model mismatch and design defenses robust to heterogeneous attackers.

Integrating large language models (LLMs) into robotic systems has revolutionised embodied artificial intelligence, enabling advanced decision-making and adaptability. However, ensuring reliability, encompassing both security against adversarial attacks and safety in complex environments, remains a critical challenge. To address this, we propose a unified framework that mitigates prompt injection attacks while enforcing operational safety through robust validation mechanisms. Our approach combines prompt assembling, state management, and safety validation, evaluated using both performance and security metrics. Experiments show a 30.8% improvement under injection attacks and up to a 325% improvement in complex environment settings under adversarial conditions compared to baseline scenarios. This work bridges the gap between safety and security in LLM-based robotic systems, offering actionable insights for deploying reliable LLM-integrated mobile robots in real-world settings. The framework is open-sourced with simulation and physical deployment demos at https://llmeyesim.vercel.app/