Federated learning (FL) enables distributed clients to collaboratively train a global model using local private data. Nevertheless, recent studies show that conventional FL algorithms still exhibit deficiencies in privacy protection, and the server lacks a reliable and stable aggregation rule for updating the global model. This situation creates opportunities for adversaries: on the one hand, they may eavesdrop on uploaded gradients or model parameters, potentially leaking benign clients' private data; on the other hand, they may compromise clients to launch poisoning attacks that corrupt the global model. To balance accuracy and security, we propose FedFG, a robust FL framework based on flow-matching generation that simultaneously preserves client privacy and resists sophisticated poisoning attacks. On the client side, each local network is decoupled into a private feature extractor and a public classifier. Each client is further equipped with a flow-matching generator that replaces the extractor when interacting with the server, thereby protecting private features while learning an approximation of the underlying data distribution. Complementing the client-side design, the server employs a client-update verification scheme and a novel robust aggregation mechanism driven by synthetic samples produced by the flow-matching generator. Experiments on MNIST, FMNIST, and CIFAR-10 demonstrate that, compared with prior work, our approach adapts to multiple attack strategies and achieves higher accuracy while maintaining strong privacy protection.

Physical adversarial camouflage poses a severe security threat to autonomous driving systems by mapping adversarial textures onto 3D objects. Nevertheless, current methods remain brittle in complex dynamic scenarios, failing to generalize across diverse geometric (e.g., viewing configurations) and radiometric (e.g., dynamic illumination, atmospheric scattering) variations. We attribute this deficiency to two fundamental limitations in simulation and optimization. First, the reliance on coarse, oversimplified simulations (e.g., via CARLA) induces a significant domain gap, confining optimization to a biased feature space. Second, standard strategies targeting average performance result in a rugged loss landscape, leaving the camouflage vulnerable to configuration shifts.To bridge these gaps, we propose the Relightable Physical 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) based Attack framework (R-PGA). Technically, to address the simulation fidelity issue, we leverage 3DGS to ensure photo-realistic reconstruction and augment it with physically disentangled attributes to decouple intrinsic material from lighting. Furthermore, we design a hybrid rendering pipeline that leverages precise Relightable 3DGS for foreground rendering, while employing a pre-trained image translation model to synthesize plausible relighted backgrounds that align with the relighted foreground.To address the optimization robustness issue, we propose the Hard Physical Configuration Mining (HPCM) module, designed to actively mine worst-case physical configurations and suppress their corresponding loss peaks. This strategy not only diminishes the overall loss magnitude but also effectively flattens the rugged loss landscape, ensuring consistent adversarial effectiveness and robustness across varying physical configurations.

The proliferation of AIGC-driven face manipulation and deepfakes poses severe threats to media provenance, integrity, and copyright protection. Prior versatile watermarking systems typically rely on embedding explicit localization payloads, which introduces a fidelity--functionality trade-off: larger localization signals degrade visual quality and often reduce decoding robustness under strong generative edits. Moreover, existing methods rarely support content recovery, limiting their forensic value when original evidence must be reconstructed. To address these challenges, we present VeriFi, a versatile watermarking framework that unifies copyright protection, pixel-level manipulation localization, and high-fidelity face content recovery. VeriFi makes three key contributions: (1) it embeds a compact semantic latent watermark that serves as an content-preserving prior, enabling faithful restoration even after severe manipulations; (2) it achieves fine-grained localization without embedding localization-specific artifacts by correlating image features with decoded provenance signals; and (3) it introduces an AIGC attack simulator that combines latent-space mixing with seamless blending to improve robustness to realistic deepfake pipelines. Extensive experiments on CelebA-HQ and FFHQ show that VeriFi consistently outperforms strong baselines in watermark robustness, localization accuracy, and recovery quality, providing a practical and verifiable defense for deepfake forensics.

The increasing realism of AI-Generated Images (AIGI) has created an urgent need for forensic tools capable of reliably distinguishing synthetic content from authentic imagery. Existing detectors are typically tailored to specific forgery artifacts--such as frequency-domain patterns or semantic inconsistencies--leading to specialized performance and, at times, conflicting judgments. To address these limitations, we present \textbf{AgentFoX}, a Large Language Model-driven framework that redefines AIGI detection as a dynamic, multi-phase analytical process. Our approach employs a quick-integration fusion mechanism guided by a curated knowledge base comprising calibrated Expert Profiles and contextual Clustering Profiles. During inference, the agent begins with high-level semantic assessment, then transitions to fine-grained, context-aware synthesis of signal-level expert evidence, resolving contradictions through structured reasoning. Instead of returning a coarse binary output, AgentFoX produces a detailed, human-readable forensic report that substantiates its verdict, enhancing interpretability and trustworthiness for real-world deployment. Beyond providing a novel detection solution, this work introduces a scalable agentic paradigm that facilitates intelligent integration of future and evolving forensic tools.

Autonomous LLM-based agents increasingly operate as long-running processes forming densely interconnected multi-agent ecosystems, whose security properties remain largely unexplored. In particular, OpenClaw, an open-source platform with over 40{,}000 active instances, has stood out recently with its persistent configurations, tool-execution privileges, and cross-platform messaging capabilities. In this work, we present ClawWorm, the first self-replicating worm attack against a production-scale agent framework, achieving a fully autonomous infection cycle initiated by a single message: the worm first hijacks the victim's core configuration to establish persistent presence across session restarts, then executes an arbitrary payload upon each reboot, and finally propagates itself to every newly encountered peer without further attacker intervention. We evaluate the attack on a controlled testbed across three distinct infection vectors and three payload types, demonstrating high success rates in end-to-end infection, sustained multi-hop propagation, and payload independence from the worm mechanism. We analyse the architectural root causes underlying these vulnerabilities and propose defence strategies targeting each identified trust boundary. Code and samples will be released upon completion of responsible disclosure.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) enable interpretable multimedia forensics by generating textual rationales for forgery detection. However, processing dense visual sequences incurs high computational costs, particularly for high-resolution images and videos. Visual token pruning is a practical acceleration strategy, yet existing methods are largely semantic-driven, retaining salient objects while discarding background regions where manipulation traces such as high-frequency anomalies and temporal jitters often reside. To address this issue, we introduce ForensicZip, a training-free framework that reformulates token compression from a forgery-driven perspective. ForensicZip models temporal token evolution as a Birth-Death Optimal Transport problem with a slack dummy node, quantifying physical discontinuities indicating transient generative artifacts. The forensic scoring further integrates transport-based novelty with high-frequency priors to separate forensic evidence from semantic content under large-ratio compression. Experiments on deepfake and AIGC benchmarks show that at 10\% token retention, ForensicZip achieves $2.97\times$ speedup and over 90\% FLOPs reduction while maintaining state-of-the-art detection performance.

This paper investigates the challenging task of detecting backdoored text-to-image models under black-box settings and introduces a novel detection framework BlackMirror. Existing approaches typically rely on analyzing image-level similarity, under the assumption that backdoor-triggered generations exhibit strong consistency across samples. However, they struggle to generalize to recently emerging backdoor attacks, where backdoored generations can appear visually diverse. BlackMirror is motivated by an observation: across backdoor attacks, {only partial semantic patterns within the generated image are steadily manipulated, while the rest of the content remains diverse or benign. Accordingly, BlackMirror consists of two components: MirrorMatch, which aligns visual patterns with the corresponding instructions to detect semantic deviations; and MirrorVerify, which evaluates the stability of these deviations across varied prompts to distinguish true backdoor behavior from benign responses. BlackMirror is a general, training-free framework that can be deployed as a plug-and-play module in Model-as-a-Service (MaaS) applications. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that BlackMirror achieves accurate detection across a wide range of attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/Ferry-Li/BlackMirror.

Extensive research demonstrates that Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) models are susceptible to adversarially constructed inputs (i.e., adversarial examples), which can mislead the agent to take suboptimal or unsafe actions. Recent methods improve attack effectiveness by leveraging future rewards to guide adversarial perturbation generation over sequential time steps (i.e., reward-based attacks). However, these methods are unable to capture dependencies between different time steps in the perturbation generation process, resulting in a weak temporal correlation between the current perturbation and previous perturbations.In this paper, we propose a novel method called Advantage-based Adversarial Transformer (AAT), which can generate adversarial examples with stronger temporal correlations (i.e., time-correlated adversarial examples) to improve the attack performance. AAT employs a multi-scale causal self-attention (MSCSA) mechanism to dynamically capture dependencies between historical information from different time periods and the current state, thus enhancing the correlation between the current perturbation and the previous perturbation. Moreover, AAT introduces a weighted advantage mechanism, which quantifies the effectiveness of a perturbation in a given state and guides the generation process toward high-performance adversarial examples by sampling high-advantage regions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the performance of AAT matches or surpasses mainstream adversarial attack baselines on Atari, DeepMind Control Suite and Google football tasks.

Agent skills are becoming a core abstraction in coding agents, packaging long-form instructions and auxiliary scripts to extend tool-augmented behaviors. This abstraction introduces an under-measured attack surface: skill-based prompt injection, where poisoned skills can steer agents away from user intent and safety policies. In practice, naive injections often fail because the malicious intent is too explicit or drifts too far from the original skill, leading agents to ignore or refuse them; existing attacks are also largely hand-crafted. We propose the first automated framework for stealthy prompt injection tailored to agent skills. The framework forms a closed loop with three agents: an Attack Agent that synthesizes injection skills under explicit stealth constraints, a Code Agent that executes tasks using the injected skills in a realistic tool environment, and an Evaluate Agent that logs action traces (e.g., tool calls and file operations) and verifies whether targeted malicious behaviors occurred. We also propose a malicious payload hiding strategy that conceals adversarial operations in auxiliary scripts while injecting optimized inducement prompts to trigger tool execution. Extensive experiments across diverse coding-agent settings and real-world software engineering tasks show that our method consistently achieves high attack success rates under realistic settings.

Harmful fine-tuning can invalidate safety alignment of large language models, exposing significant safety risks. In this paper, we utilize the attention sink mechanism to mitigate harmful fine-tuning. Specifically, we first measure a statistic named \emph{sink divergence} for each attention head and observe that \emph{different attention heads exhibit two different signs of sink divergence}. To understand its safety implications, we conduct experiments and find that the number of attention heads of positive sink divergence increases along with the increase of the model's harmfulness when undergoing harmful fine-tuning. Based on this finding, we propose a separable sink divergence hypothesis -- \emph{attention heads associating with learning harmful patterns during fine-tuning are separable by their sign of sink divergence}. Based on the hypothesis, we propose a fine-tuning-stage defense, dubbed Surgery. Surgery utilizes a regularizer for sink divergence suppression, which steers attention heads toward the negative sink divergence group, thereby reducing the model's tendency to learn and amplify harmful patterns. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Surgery improves defense performance by 5.90\%, 11.25\%, and 9.55\% on the BeaverTails, HarmBench, and SorryBench benchmarks, respectively. Source code is available on https://github.com/Lslland/Surgery.

We present GuardReasoner-Omni, a reasoning-based guardrail model designed to moderate text, image, and video data. First, we construct a comprehensive training corpus comprising 148k samples spanning these three modalities. Our training pipeline follows a two-stage paradigm to incentivize the model to deliberate before making decisions: (1) conducting SFT to cold-start the model with explicit reasoning capabilities and structural adherence; and (2) performing RL, incorporating an error-driven exploration reward to incentivize deeper reasoning on hard samples. We release a suite of models scaled at 2B and 4B parameters. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GuardReasoner-Omni achieves superior performance compared to existing state-of-the-art baselines across various guardrail benchmarks. Notably, GuardReasoner-Omni (2B) significantly surpasses the runner-up by 5.3% F1 score.

Large vision-language models (VLMs) are vulnerable to transfer-based adversarial perturbations, enabling attackers to optimize on surrogate models and manipulate black-box VLM outputs. Prior targeted transfer attacks often overfit surrogate-specific embedding space by relying on a single reference and emphasizing final-layer alignment, which underutilizes intermediate semantics and degrades transfer across heterogeneous VLMs. To address this, we propose SGHA-Attack, a Semantic-Guided Hierarchical Alignment framework that adopts multiple target references and enforces intermediate-layer consistency. Concretely, we generate a visually grounded reference pool by sampling a frozen text-to-image model conditioned on the target prompt, and then carefully select the Top-K most semantically relevant anchors under the surrogate to form a weighted mixture for stable optimization guidance. Building on these anchors, SGHA-Attack injects target semantics throughout the feature hierarchy by aligning intermediate visual representations at both global and spatial granularities across multiple depths, and by synchronizing intermediate visual and textual features in a shared latent subspace to provide early cross-modal supervision before the final projection. Extensive experiments on open-source and commercial black-box VLMs show that SGHA-Attack achieves stronger targeted transferability than prior methods and remains robust under preprocessing and purification defenses.

Modern deepfakes have evolved into localized and intermittent manipulations that require fine-grained temporal localization. The prohibitive cost of frame-level annotation makes weakly supervised methods a practical necessity, which rely only on video-level labels. To this end, we propose Reconstruction-based Temporal Deepfake Localization (RT-DeepLoc), a weakly supervised temporal forgery localization framework that identifies forgeries via reconstruction errors. Our framework uses a Masked Autoencoder (MAE) trained exclusively on authentic data to learn its intrinsic spatiotemporal patterns; this allows the model to produce significant reconstruction discrepancies for forged segments, effectively providing the missing fine-grained cues for localization. To robustly leverage these indicators, we introduce a novel Asymmetric Intra-video Contrastive Loss (AICL). By focusing on the compactness of authentic features guided by these reconstruction cues, AICL establishes a stable decision boundary that enhances local discrimination while preserving generalization to unseen forgeries. Extensive experiments on large-scale datasets, including LAV-DF, demonstrate that RT-DeepLoc achieves state-of-the-art performance in weakly-supervised temporal forgery localization.

The exceptional performance of diffusion models establishes them as high-value intellectual property but exposes them to unauthorized replication. Existing protection methods either modify the model to embed watermarks, which impairs performance, or extract model fingerprints by manipulating the denoising process, rendering them incompatible with black-box APIs. In this paper, we propose TrajPrint, a completely lossless and training-free framework that verifies model copyright by extracting unique manifold fingerprints formed during deterministic generation. Specifically, we first utilize a watermarked image as an anchor and exactly trace the path back to its trajectory origin, effectively locking the model fingerprint mapped by this path. Subsequently, we implement a joint optimization strategy that employs dual-end anchoring to synthesize a specific fingerprint noise, which strictly adheres to the target manifold for robust watermark recovery. As input, it enables the protected target model to recover the watermarked image, while failing on non-target models. Finally, we achieved verification via atomic inference and statistical hypothesis testing. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TrajPrint achieves lossless verification in black-box API scenarios with superior robustness against model modifications.

Deepfake detection is a widely researched topic that is crucial for combating the spread of malicious content, with existing methods mainly modeling the problem as classification or spatial localization. The rapid advancements in generative models impose new demands on Deepfake detection. In this paper, we propose multimodal alignment and reinforcement for explainable Deepfake detection via vision-language models, termed MARE, which aims to enhance the accuracy and reliability of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) in Deepfake detection and reasoning. Specifically, MARE designs comprehensive reward functions, incorporating reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), to incentivize the generation of text-spatially aligned reasoning content that adheres to human preferences. Besides, MARE introduces a forgery disentanglement module to capture intrinsic forgery traces from high-level facial semantics, thereby improving its authenticity detection capability. We conduct thorough evaluations on the reasoning content generated by MARE. Both quantitative and qualitative experimental results demonstrate that MARE achieves state-of-the-art performance in terms of accuracy and reliability.

Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical threat to Large Language Models (LLMs), bypassing safety mechanisms by progressively constructing adversarial contexts from scratch and incrementally refining prompts. However, existing methods suffer from the inefficiency of incremental context construction that requires step-by-step LLM interaction, and often stagnate in suboptimal regions due to surface-level optimization. In this paper, we characterize the Intent-Context Coupling phenomenon, revealing that LLM safety constraints are significantly relaxed when a malicious intent is coupled with a semantically congruent context pattern. Driven by this insight, we propose ICON, an automated multi-turn jailbreak framework that efficiently constructs an authoritative-style context via prior-guided semantic routing. Specifically, ICON first routes the malicious intent to a congruent context pattern (e.g., Scientific Research) and instantiates it into an attack prompt sequence. This sequence progressively builds the authoritative-style context and ultimately elicits prohibited content. In addition, ICON incorporates a Hierarchical Optimization Strategy that combines local prompt refinement with global context switching, preventing the attack from stagnating in ineffective contexts. Experimental results across eight SOTA LLMs demonstrate the effectiveness of ICON, achieving a state-of-the-art average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 97.1\%. Code is available at https://github.com/xwlin-roy/ICON.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in code generation by leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) methods. However, the computational costs associated with LLM inference, particularly in terms of latency and energy consumption, have received limited attention in the security context. This paper introduces DrainCode, the first adversarial attack targeting the computational efficiency of RAG-based code generation systems. By strategically poisoning retrieval contexts through a mutation-based approach, DrainCode forces LLMs to produce significantly longer outputs, thereby increasing GPU latency and energy consumption. We evaluate the effectiveness of DrainCode across multiple models. Our experiments show that DrainCode achieves up to an 85% increase in latency, a 49% increase in energy consumption, and more than a 3x increase in output length compared to the baseline. Furthermore, we demonstrate the generalizability of the attack across different prompting strategies and its effectiveness compared to different defenses. The results highlight DrainCode as a potential method for increasing the computational overhead of LLMs, making it useful for evaluating LLM security in resource-constrained environments. We provide code and data at https://github.com/DeepSoftwareAnalytics/DrainCode.

Deep Neural Networks remain inherently vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Traditional test-time defenses largely operate under the paradigm of internal diagnosis methods like model repairing or input robustness, yet these approaches are often fragile under advanced attacks as they remain entangled with the victim model's corrupted parameters. We propose a paradigm shift from Internal Diagnosis to External Semantic Auditing, arguing that effective defense requires decoupling safety from the victim model via an independent, semantically grounded auditor. To this end, we present a framework harnessing Universal Vision-Language Models (VLMs) as evolving semantic gatekeepers. We introduce PRISM (Prototype Refinement & Inspection via Statistical Monitoring), which overcomes the domain gap of general VLMs through two key mechanisms: a Hybrid VLM Teacher that dynamically refines visual prototypes online, and an Adaptive Router powered by statistical margin monitoring to calibrate gating thresholds in real-time. Extensive evaluation across 17 datasets and 11 attack types demonstrates that PRISM achieves state-of-the-art performance, suppressing Attack Success Rate to <1% on CIFAR-10 while improving clean accuracy, establishing a new standard for model-agnostic, externalized security.

Current AI-Generated Image (AIGI) detection approaches predominantly rely on binary classification to distinguish real from synthetic images, often lacking interpretable or convincing evidence to substantiate their decisions. This limitation stems from existing AIGI detection benchmarks, which, despite featuring a broad collection of synthetic images, remain restricted in their coverage of artifact diversity and lack detailed, localized annotations. To bridge this gap, we introduce a fine-grained benchmark towards eXplainable AI-Generated image Detection, named X-AIGD, which provides pixel-level, categorized annotations of perceptual artifacts, spanning low-level distortions, high-level semantics, and cognitive-level counterfactuals. These comprehensive annotations facilitate fine-grained interpretability evaluation and deeper insight into model decision-making processes. Our extensive investigation using X-AIGD provides several key insights: (1) Existing AIGI detectors demonstrate negligible reliance on perceptual artifacts, even at the most basic distortion level. (2) While AIGI detectors can be trained to identify specific artifacts, they still substantially base their judgment on uninterpretable features. (3) Explicitly aligning model attention with artifact regions can increase the interpretability and generalization of detectors. The data and code are available at: https://github.com/Coxy7/X-AIGD.

The rapid evolution of diffusion models has democratized face swapping but also raises concerns about privacy and identity security. Existing proactive defenses, often adapted from image editing attacks, prove ineffective in this context. We attribute this failure to an oversight of the structural resilience and the unique static conditional guidance mechanism inherent in face swapping systems. To address this, we propose VoidFace, a systemic defense method that views face swapping as a coupled identity pathway. By injecting perturbations at critical bottlenecks, VoidFace induces cascading disruption throughout the pipeline. Specifically, we first introduce localization disruption and identity erasure to degrade physical regression and semantic embeddings, thereby impairing the accurate modeling of the source face. We then intervene in the generative domain by decoupling attention mechanisms to sever identity injection, and corrupting intermediate diffusion features to prevent the reconstruction of source identity. To ensure visual imperceptibility, we perform adversarial search in the latent manifold, guided by a perceptual adaptive strategy to balance attack potency with image quality. Extensive experiments show that VoidFace outperforms existing defenses across various diffusion-based swapping models, while producing adversarial faces with superior visual quality.