Single Image Super-Resolution (SISR) aims to recover high-resolution images from low-resolution inputs. Unlike SISR, Reference-based Super-Resolution (RefSR) leverages an additional high-resolution reference image to facilitate the recovery of high-frequency textures. However, existing research mainly focuses on backdoor attacks targeting RefSR, while the vulnerability of the adversarial attacks targeting RefSR has not been fully explored. To fill this research gap, we propose RefSR-Adv, an adversarial attack that degrades SR outputs by perturbing only the reference image. By maximizing the difference between adversarial and clean outputs, RefSR-Adv induces significant performance degradation and generates severe artifacts across CNN, Transformer, and Mamba architectures on the CUFED5, WR-SR, and DRefSR datasets. Importantly, experiments confirm a positive correlation between the similarity of the low-resolution input and the reference image and attack effectiveness, revealing that the model's over-reliance on reference features is a key security flaw. This study reveals a security vulnerability in RefSR systems, aiming to urge researchers to pay attention to the robustness of RefSR.

Watermarking large language models (LLMs) is vital for preventing their misuse, including the fabrication of fake news, plagiarism, and spam. It is especially important to watermark LLM-generated code, as it often contains intellectual property.However, we found that existing methods for watermarking LLM-generated code fail to address comment removal attack.In such cases, an attacker can simply remove the comments from the generated code without affecting its functionality, significantly reducing the effectiveness of current code-watermarking techniques.On the other hand, injecting a watermark into code is challenging because, as previous works have noted, most code represents a low-entropy scenario compared to natural language. Our approach to addressing this issue involves leveraging prior knowledge to distinguish between low-entropy and high-entropy parts of the code, as indicated by a Cue List of words.We then inject the watermark guided by this Cue List, achieving higher detectability and usability than existing methods.We evaluated our proposed method on HumanEvaland compared our method with three state-of-the-art code watermarking techniques. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) offers an efficient paradigm for customizing diffusion models, but its ease of redistribution raises concerns over unauthorized use and the generation of untraceable content. Existing watermarking techniques either target base models or verify LoRA modules themselves, yet they fail to propagate watermarks to generated images, leaving a critical gap in traceability. Moreover, traceability watermarking designed for base models is not tightly coupled with stylization and often introduces visual degradation or high false-positive detection rates. To address these limitations, we propose AuthenLoRA, a unified watermarking framework that embeds imperceptible, traceable watermarks directly into the LoRA training process while preserving stylization quality. AuthenLoRA employs a dual-objective optimization strategy that jointly learns the target style distribution and the watermark-induced distribution shift, ensuring that any image generated with the watermarked LoRA reliably carries the watermark. We further design an expanded LoRA architecture for enhanced multi-scale adaptation and introduce a zero-message regularization mechanism that substantially reduces false positives during watermark verification. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AuthenLoRA achieves high-fidelity stylization, robust watermark propagation, and significantly lower false-positive rates compared with existing approaches. Open-source implementation is available at: https://github.com/ShiFangming0823/AuthenLoRA

Robustness verification is a promising technique for rigorously proving Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) robustly. A key challenge is to over-approximate the nonlinear activation functions with linear constraints, which can transform the verification problem into an efficiently solvable linear programming problem. Existing methods over-approximate the nonlinear parts with linear bounding planes individually, which may cause significant over-estimation and lead to lower verification accuracy. In this paper, in order to tightly enclose the three-dimensional nonlinear surface generated by the Hadamard product, we propose a novel truncated rectangular prism formed by two linear relaxation planes and a refinement-driven method to minimize both its volume and surface area for tighter over-approximation. Based on this approximation, we implement a prototype DeepPrism for RNN robustness verification. The experimental results demonstrate that \emph{DeepPrism} has significant improvement compared with the state-of-the-art approaches in various tasks of image classification, speech recognition and sentiment analysis.

The rapid progress of graph generation has raised new security concerns, particularly regarding backdoor vulnerabilities. While prior work has explored backdoor attacks in image diffusion and unconditional graph generation, conditional, especially text-guided graph generation remains largely unexamined. This paper proposes BadGraph, a backdoor attack method against latent diffusion models for text-guided graph generation. BadGraph leverages textual triggers to poison training data, covertly implanting backdoors that induce attacker-specified subgraphs during inference when triggers appear, while preserving normal performance on clean inputs. Extensive experiments on four benchmark datasets (PubChem, ChEBI-20, PCDes, MoMu) demonstrate the effectiveness and stealth of the attack: less than 10% poisoning rate can achieves 50% attack success rate, while 24% suffices for over 80% success rate, with negligible performance degradation on benign samples. Ablation studies further reveal that the backdoor is implanted during VAE and diffusion training rather than pretraining. These findings reveal the security vulnerabilities in latent diffusion models of text-guided graph generation, highlight the serious risks in models' applications such as drug discovery and underscore the need for robust defenses against the backdoor attack in such diffusion models.

Feature embedding has become a cornerstone technology for processing high-dimensional and complex data, which results in that Embedding as a Service (EaaS) models have been widely deployed in the cloud. To protect the intellectual property of EaaS models, existing methods apply digital watermarking to inject specific backdoor triggers into EaaS models by modifying training samples or network parameters. However, these methods inevitably produce detectable patterns through semantic analysis and exhibit susceptibility to geometric transformations including rotation, scaling, and translation (RST). To address this problem, we propose a fingerprinting framework for EaaS models, rather than merely refining existing watermarking techniques. Different from watermarking techniques, the proposed method establishes EaaS model ownership through geometric analysis of embedding space's topological structure, rather than relying on the modified training samples or triggers. The key innovation lies in modeling the victim and suspicious embeddings as point clouds, allowing us to perform robust spatial alignment and similarity measurement, which inherently resists RST attacks. Experimental results evaluated on visual and textual embedding tasks verify the superiority and applicability. This research reveals inherent characteristics of EaaS models and provides a promising solution for ownership verification of EaaS models under the black-box scenario.

As a valuable digital product, deep neural networks (DNNs) face increasingly severe threats to the intellectual property, making it necessary to develop effective technical measures to protect them. Trigger-based watermarking methods achieve copyright protection by embedding triggers into the host DNNs. However, the attacker may remove the watermark by pruning or fine-tuning. We model this interaction as a game under conditions of information asymmetry, namely, the defender embeds a secret watermark with private knowledge, while the attacker can only access the watermarked model and seek removal. We define strategies, costs, and utilities for both players, derive the attacker's optimal pruning budget, and establish an exponential lower bound on the accuracy of watermark detection after attack. Experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of the watermarked model, and indicate that sparse watermarking can resist removal with negligible accuracy loss. This study highlights the effectiveness of game-theoretic analysis in guiding the design of robust watermarking schemes for model copyright protection.

Backdoor attacks pose a significant security threat to natural language processing (NLP) systems, but existing methods lack explainable trigger mechanisms and fail to quantitatively model vulnerability patterns. This work pioneers the quantitative connection between explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) and backdoor attacks, introducing Sensitron, a novel modular framework for crafting stealthy and robust backdoor triggers. Sensitron employs a progressive refinement approach where Dynamic Meta-Sensitivity Analysis (DMSA) first identifies potentially vulnerable input tokens, Hierarchical SHAP Estimation (H-SHAP) then provides explainable attribution to precisely pinpoint the most influential tokens, and finally a Plug-and-Rank mechanism that generates contextually appropriate triggers. We establish the first mathematical correlation (Sensitivity Ranking Correlation, SRC=0.83) between explainability scores and empirical attack success, enabling precise targeting of model vulnerabilities. Sensitron achieves 97.8% Attack Success Rate (ASR) (+5.8% over state-of-the-art (SOTA)) with 85.4% ASR at 0.1% poisoning rate, demonstrating robust resistance against multiple SOTA defenses. This work reveals fundamental NLP vulnerabilities and provides new attack vectors through weaponized explainability.

Existing watermarking methods for large language models (LLMs) mainly embed watermark by adjusting the token sampling prediction or post-processing, lacking intrinsic coupling with LLMs, which may significantly reduce the semantic quality of the generated marked texts. Traditional watermarking methods based on training or fine-tuning may be extendable to LLMs. However, most of them are limited to the white-box scenario, or very time-consuming due to the massive parameters of LLMs. In this paper, we present a new watermarking framework for LLMs, where the watermark is embedded into the LLM by manipulating the internal parameters of the LLM, and can be extracted from the generated text without accessing the LLM. Comparing with related methods, the proposed method entangles the watermark with the intrinsic parameters of the LLM, which better balances the robustness and imperceptibility of the watermark. Moreover, the proposed method enables us to extract the watermark under the black-box scenario, which is computationally efficient for use. Experimental results have also verified the feasibility, superiority and practicality. This work provides a new perspective different from mainstream works, which may shed light on future research.

Pickle deserialization vulnerabilities have persisted throughout Python's history, remaining widely recognized yet unresolved. Due to its ability to transparently save and restore complex objects into byte streams, many AI/ML frameworks continue to adopt pickle as the model serialization protocol despite its inherent risks. As the open-source model ecosystem grows, model-sharing platforms such as Hugging Face have attracted massive participation, significantly amplifying the real-world risks of pickle exploitation and opening new avenues for model supply chain poisoning. Although several state-of-the-art scanners have been developed to detect poisoned models, their incomplete understanding of the poisoning surface leaves the detection logic fragile and allows attackers to bypass them. In this work, we present the first systematic disclosure of the pickle-based model poisoning surface from both model loading and risky function perspectives. Our research demonstrates how pickle-based model poisoning can remain stealthy and highlights critical gaps in current scanning solutions. On the model loading surface, we identify 22 distinct pickle-based model loading paths across five foundational AI/ML frameworks, 19 of which are entirely missed by existing scanners. We further develop a bypass technique named Exception-Oriented Programming (EOP) and discover 9 EOP instances, 7 of which can bypass all scanners. On the risky function surface, we discover 133 exploitable gadgets, achieving almost a 100% bypass rate. Even against the best-performing scanner, these gadgets maintain an 89% bypass rate. By systematically revealing the pickle-based model poisoning surface, we achieve practical and robust bypasses against real-world scanners. We responsibly disclose our findings to corresponding vendors, receiving acknowledgments and a $6000 bug bounty.

Neural networks can be fragile to input noise and adversarial attacks. In this work, we consider Convolutional Neural Ordinary Differential Equations (NODEs), a family of continuous-depth neural networks represented by dynamical systems, and propose to use contraction theory to improve their robustness. For a contractive dynamical system two trajectories starting from different initial conditions converge to each other exponentially fast. Contractive Convolutional NODEs can enjoy increased robustness as slight perturbations of the features do not cause a significant change in the output. Contractivity can be induced during training by using a regularization term involving the Jacobian of the system dynamics. To reduce the computational burden, we show that it can also be promoted using carefully selected weight regularization terms for a class of NODEs with slope-restricted activation functions. The performance of the proposed regularizers is illustrated through benchmark image classification tasks on MNIST and FashionMNIST datasets, where images are corrupted by different kinds of noise and attacks.

Watermarking deep neural network (DNN) models has attracted a great deal of attention and interest in recent years because of the increasing demand to protect the intellectual property of DNN models. Many practical algorithms have been proposed by covertly embedding a secret watermark into a given DNN model through either parametric/structural modulation or backdooring against intellectual property infringement from the attacker while preserving the model performance on the original task. Despite the performance of these approaches, the lack of basic research restricts the algorithmic design to either a trial-based method or a data-driven technique. This has motivated the authors in this paper to introduce a game between the model attacker and the model defender for trigger-based black-box model watermarking. For each of the two players, we construct the payoff function and determine the optimal response, which enriches the theoretical foundation of model watermarking and may inspire us to develop novel schemes in the future.