The rapid advancement and widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) have elevated the need for reliable AI-generated content (AIGC) detection, which remains challenging as models evolve. We introduce AIGC-text-bank, a comprehensive multi-domain dataset with diverse LLM sources and authorship scenarios, and propose REVEAL, a detection framework that generates interpretable reasoning chains before classification. Our approach uses a two-stage training strategy: supervised fine-tuning to establish reasoning capabilities, followed by reinforcement learning to improve accuracy, improve logical consistency, and reduce hallucinations. Extensive experiments show that REVEAL achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple benchmarks, offering a robust and transparent solution for AIGC detection. The project is open-source at https://aka.ms/reveal

Despite the remarkable success of Vision Transformers (ViTs) across a wide range of vision tasks, recent studies have revealed that they remain vulnerable to adversarial examples, much like Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). A common empirical defense strategy is adversarial training, yet the theoretical underpinnings of its robustness in ViTs remain largely unexplored. In this work, we present the first theoretical analysis of adversarial training under simplified ViT architectures. We show that, when trained under a signal-to-noise ratio that satisfies a certain condition and within a moderate perturbation budget, adversarial training enables ViTs to achieve nearly zero robust training loss and robust generalization error under certain regimes. Remarkably, this leads to strong generalization even in the presence of overfitting, a phenomenon known as \emph{benign overfitting}, previously only observed in CNNs (with adversarial training). Experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets further validate our theoretical findings.

Recently, detecting AI-generated images produced by diffusion-based models has attracted increasing attention due to their potential threat to safety. Among existing approaches, reconstruction-based methods have emerged as a prominent paradigm for this task. However, we find that such methods exhibit severe security vulnerabilities to adversarial perturbations; that is, by adding imperceptible adversarial perturbations to input images, the detection accuracy of classifiers collapses to near zero. To verify this threat, we present a systematic evaluation of the adversarial robustness of three representative detectors across four diverse generative backbone models. First, we construct adversarial attacks in white-box scenarios, which degrade the performance of all well-trained detectors. Moreover, we find that these attacks demonstrate transferability; specifically, attacks crafted against one detector can be transferred to others, indicating that adversarial attacks on detectors can also be constructed in a black-box setting. Finally, we assess common countermeasures and find that standard defense methods against adversarial attacks provide limited mitigation. We attribute these failures to the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of attacked samples as perceived by the detectors. Overall, our results reveal fundamental security limitations of reconstruction-based detectors and highlight the need to rethink existing detection strategies.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used, their security risks have drawn increasing attention. Existing research reveals that LLMs are highly susceptible to jailbreak attacks, with effectiveness varying across language contexts. This paper investigates the role of classical Chinese in jailbreak attacks. Owing to its conciseness and obscurity, classical Chinese can partially bypass existing safety constraints, exposing notable vulnerabilities in LLMs. Based on this observation, this paper proposes a framework, CC-BOS, for the automatic generation of classical Chinese adversarial prompts based on multi-dimensional fruit fly optimization, facilitating efficient and automated jailbreak attacks in black-box settings. Prompts are encoded into eight policy dimensions-covering role, behavior, mechanism, metaphor, expression, knowledge, trigger pattern and context; and iteratively refined via smell search, visual search, and cauchy mutation. This design enables efficient exploration of the search space, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of black-box jailbreak attacks. To enhance readability and evaluation accuracy, we further design a classical Chinese to English translation module. Extensive experiments demonstrate that effectiveness of the proposed CC-BOS, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art jailbreak attack methods.

In Embedding-as-an-Interface (EaaI) settings, pre-trained models are queried for Intermediate Representations (IRs). The distributional properties of IRs can leak training-set membership signals, enabling Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) whose strength varies across layers. Although Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) mitigates such leakage, existing implementations employ per-example gradient clipping and a uniform, layer-agnostic noise multiplier, ignoring heterogeneous layer-wise MIA vulnerability. This paper introduces Layer-wise MIA-risk-aware DP-SGD (LM-DP-SGD), which adaptively allocates privacy protection across layers in proportion to their MIA risk. Specifically, LM-DP-SGD trains a shadow model on a public shadow dataset, extracts per-layer IRs from its train/test splits, and fits layer-specific MIA adversaries, using their attack error rates as MIA-risk estimates. Leveraging the cross-dataset transferability of MIAs, these estimates are then used to reweight each layer's contribution to the globally clipped gradient during private training, providing layer-appropriate protection under a fixed noise magnitude. We further establish theoretical guarantees on both privacy and convergence of LM-DP-SGD. Extensive experiments show that, under the same privacy budget, LM-DP-SGD reduces the peak IR-level MIA risk while preserving utility, yielding a superior privacy-utility trade-off.

Omni-modal Large Language Models (OLLMs) greatly expand LLMs' multimodal capabilities but also introduce cross-modal safety risks. However, a systematic understanding of vulnerabilities in omni-modal interactions remains lacking. To bridge this gap, we establish a modality-semantics decoupling principle and construct the AdvBench-Omni dataset, which reveals a significant vulnerability in OLLMs. Mechanistic analysis uncovers a Mid-layer Dissolution phenomenon driven by refusal vector magnitude shrinkage, alongside the existence of a modal-invariant pure refusal direction. Inspired by these insights, we extract a golden refusal vector using Singular Value Decomposition and propose OmniSteer, which utilizes lightweight adapters to modulate intervention intensity adaptively. Extensive experiments show that our method not only increases the Refusal Success Rate against harmful inputs from 69.9% to 91.2%, but also effectively preserves the general capabilities across all modalities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/zhrli324/omni-safety-research.

In decentralized federated learning (DFL), the presence of abnormal clients, often caused by noisy or poisoned data, can significantly disrupt the learning process and degrade the overall robustness of the model. Previous methods on this issue often require a sufficiently large number of normal neighboring clients or prior knowledge of reliable clients, which reduces the practical applicability of DFL. To address these limitations, we develop here a novel adaptive DFL (aDFL) approach for robust estimation. The key idea is to adaptively adjust the learning rates of clients. By assigning smaller rates to suspicious clients and larger rates to normal clients, aDFL mitigates the negative impact of abnormal clients on the global model in a fully adaptive way. Our theory does not put any stringent conditions on neighboring nodes and requires no prior knowledge. A rigorous convergence analysis is provided to guarantee the oracle property of aDFL. Extensive numerical experiments demonstrate the superior performance of the aDFL method.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show remarkable capabilities, their safety alignments are susceptible to jailbreak attacks. Existing attack methods typically focus on text-image interplay, treating the visual modality as a secondary prompt. This approach underutilizes the unique potential of images to carry complex, contextual information. To address this gap, we propose a new image-centric attack method, Contextual Image Attack (CIA), which employs a multi-agent system to subtly embeds harmful queries into seemingly benign visual contexts using four distinct visualization strategies. To further enhance the attack's efficacy, the system incorporate contextual element enhancement and automatic toxicity obfuscation techniques. Experimental results on the MMSafetyBench-tiny dataset show that CIA achieves high toxicity scores of 4.73 and 4.83 against the GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-VL-72B models, respectively, with Attack Success Rates (ASR) reaching 86.31\% and 91.07\%. Our method significantly outperforms prior work, demonstrating that the visual modality itself is a potent vector for jailbreaking advanced MLLMs.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Model (LLM)-driven multi-agent systems has significantly streamlined software developing tasks, enabling users with little technical expertise to develop executable applications. While these systems democratize software creation through natural language requirements, they introduce significant security risks that remain largely unexplored. We identify two risky scenarios: Malicious User with Benign Agents (MU-BA) and Benign User with Malicious Agents (BU-MA). We introduce the Implicit Malicious Behavior Injection Attack (IMBIA), demonstrating how multi-agent systems can be manipulated to generate software with concealed malicious capabilities beneath seemingly benign applications, and propose Adv-IMBIA as a defense mechanism. Evaluations across ChatDev, MetaGPT, and AgentVerse frameworks reveal varying vulnerability patterns, with IMBIA achieving attack success rates of 93%, 45%, and 71% in MU-BA scenarios, and 71%, 84%, and 45% in BU-MA scenarios. Our defense mechanism reduced attack success rates significantly, particularly in the MU-BA scenario. Further analysis reveals that compromised agents in the coding and testing phases pose significantly greater security risks, while also identifying critical agents that require protection against malicious user exploitation. Our findings highlight the urgent need for robust security measures in multi-agent software development systems and provide practical guidelines for implementing targeted, resource-efficient defensive strategies.

Federated learning synchronizes models through gradient transmission and aggregation. However, these gradients pose significant privacy risks, as sensitive training data is embedded within them. Existing gradient inversion attacks suffer from significantly degraded reconstruction performance when gradients are perturbed by noise-a common defense mechanism. In this paper, we introduce gradient-guided conditional diffusion models for reconstructing private images from leaked gradients, without prior knowledge of the target data distribution. Our approach leverages the inherent denoising capability of diffusion models to circumvent the partial protection offered by noise perturbation, thereby improving attack performance under such defenses. We further provide a theoretical analysis of the reconstruction error bounds and the convergence properties of the attack loss, characterizing the impact of key factors-such as noise magnitude and attacked model architecture-on reconstruction quality. Extensive experiments demonstrate our attack's superior reconstruction performance with Gaussian noise-perturbed gradients, and confirm our theoretical findings.

A persistent challenge in text classification (TC) is that enhancing model robustness against adversarial attacks typically degrades performance on clean data. We argue that this challenge can be resolved by modeling the distribution of clean samples in the encoder embedding manifold. To this end, we propose the Manifold-Correcting Causal Flow (MC^2F), a two-module system that operates directly on sentence embeddings. A Stratified Riemannian Continuous Normalizing Flow (SR-CNF) learns the density of the clean data manifold. It identifies out-of-distribution embeddings, which are then corrected by a Geodesic Purification Solver. This solver projects adversarial points back onto the learned manifold via the shortest path, restoring a clean, semantically coherent representation. We conducted extensive evaluations on text classification (TC) across three datasets and multiple adversarial attacks. The results demonstrate that our method, MC^2F, not only establishes a new state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness but also fully preserves performance on clean data, even yielding modest gains in accuracy.

While Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) and Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful approaches for learning on Text-Attributed Graphs (TAGs), a comprehensive understanding of their robustness remains elusive. Current evaluations are fragmented, failing to systematically investigate the distinct effects of textual and structural perturbations across diverse models and attack scenarios. To address these limitations, we introduce a unified and comprehensive framework to evaluate robustness in TAG learning. Our framework evaluates classical GNNs, robust GNNs (RGNNs), and GraphLLMs across ten datasets from four domains, under diverse text-based, structure-based, and hybrid perturbations in both poisoning and evasion scenarios. Our extensive analysis reveals multiple findings, among which three are particularly noteworthy: 1) models have inherent robustness trade-offs between text and structure, 2) the performance of GNNs and RGNNs depends heavily on the text encoder and attack type, and 3) GraphLLMs are particularly vulnerable to training data corruption. To overcome the identified trade-offs, we introduce SFT-auto, a novel framework that delivers superior and balanced robustness against both textual and structural attacks within a single model. Our work establishes a foundation for future research on TAG security and offers practical solutions for robust TAG learning in adversarial environments. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Leirunlin/TGRB.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become foundational tools in natural language processing, powering a wide range of applications and research. Many studies have shown that LLMs share significant similarities with the human brain. Recent neuroscience research has found that a small subset of biological neurons in the human brain are crucial for core cognitive functions, which raises a fundamental question: do LLMs also contain a small subset of critical neurons? In this paper, we investigate this question by proposing a Perturbation-based Causal Identification of Critical Neurons method to systematically locate such critical neurons in LLMs. Our findings reveal three key insights: (1) LLMs contain ultra-sparse critical neuron sets. Disrupting these critical neurons can cause a 72B-parameter model with over 1.1 billion neurons to completely collapse, with perplexity increasing by up to 20 orders of magnitude; (2) These critical neurons are not uniformly distributed, but tend to concentrate in the outer layers, particularly within the MLP down\_proj components; (3) Performance degradation exhibits sharp phase transitions, rather than a gradual decline, when these critical neurons are disrupted. Through comprehensive experiments across diverse model architectures and scales, we provide deeper analysis of these phenomena and their implications for LLM robustness and interpretability. These findings can offer guidance for developing more robust model architectures and improving deployment security in safety-critical applications. Our code is available at https://github.com/qqqqqqqzx/The-Achilles-Heel-of-LLMs.

Despite extensive alignment efforts, Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. To mitigate these risks, existing detection methods are essential, yet they face two major challenges: generalization and accuracy. While learning-based methods trained on specific attacks fail to generalize to unseen attacks, learning-free methods based on hand-crafted heuristics suffer from limited accuracy and reduced efficiency. To address these limitations, we propose Learning to Detect (LoD), a learnable framework that eliminates the need for any attack data or hand-crafted heuristics. LoD operates by first extracting layer-wise safety representations directly from the model's internal activations using Multi-modal Safety Concept Activation Vectors classifiers, and then converting the high-dimensional representations into a one-dimensional anomaly score for detection via a Safety Pattern Auto-Encoder. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LoD consistently achieves state-of-the-art detection performance (AUROC) across diverse unseen jailbreak attacks on multiple LVLMs, while also significantly improving efficiency. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Learning-to-Detect-51CB.