Concept erasure in text-to-image diffusion models seeks to remove undesired concepts while preserving overall generative capability. Localized erasure methods aim to restrict edits to the spatial region occupied by the target concept. However, we observe that suppressing a concept can unintentionally weaken semantically related neighbor concepts, reducing fidelity in fine-grained domains. We propose Neighbor-Aware Localized Concept Erasure (NLCE), a training-free framework designed to better preserve neighboring concepts while removing target concepts. It operates in three stages: (1) a spectrally-weighted embedding modulation that attenuates target concept directions while stabilizing neighbor concept representations, (2) an attention-guided spatial gate that identifies regions exhibiting residual concept activation, and (3) a spatially-gated hard erasure that eliminates remaining traces only where necessary. This neighbor-aware pipeline enables localized concept removal while maintaining the surrounding concept neighborhood structure. Experiments on fine-grained datasets (Oxford Flowers, Stanford Dogs) show that our method effectively removes target concepts while better preserving closely related categories. Additional results on celebrity identity, explicit content and artistic style demonstrate robustness and generalization to broader erasure scenarios.

Synthetic data is often perceived as a silver-bullet solution to data anonymization and privacy-preserving data publishing. Drawn from generative models like diffusion models, synthetic data is expected to preserve the statistical properties of the original dataset while remaining resilient to privacy attacks. Recent developments of diffusion models have been effective on a wide range of data types, but their privacy resilience, particularly for tabular formats, remains largely unexplored. MIDST challenge sought a quantitative evaluation of the privacy gain of synthetic tabular data generated by diffusion models, with a specific focus on its resistance to membership inference attacks (MIAs). Given the heterogeneity and complexity of tabular data, multiple target models were explored for MIAs, including diffusion models for single tables of mixed data types and multi-relational tables with interconnected constraints. MIDST inspired the development of novel black-box and white-box MIAs tailored to these target diffusion models as a key outcome, enabling a comprehensive evaluation of their privacy efficacy. The MIDST GitHub repository is available at https://github.com/VectorInstitute/MIDST

Computer-using agents (CUAs) act directly on graphical user interfaces, yet their perception of the screen is often unreliable. Existing work largely treats these failures as performance limitations, asking whether an action succeeds, rather than whether the agent is acting on the correct object at all. We argue that this is fundamentally a security problem. We formalize the visual confused deputy: a failure mode in which an agent authorizes an action based on a misperceived screen state, due to grounding errors, adversarial screenshot manipulation, or time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races. This gap is practically exploitable: even simple screen-level manipulations can redirect routine clicks into privileged actions while remaining indistinguishable from ordinary agent mistakes. To mitigate this threat, we propose the first guardrail that operates outside the agent's perceptual loop. Our method, dual-channel contrastive classification, independently evaluates (1) the visual click target and (2) the agent's reasoning about the action against deployment-specific knowledge bases, and blocks execution if either channel indicates risk. The key insight is that these two channels capture complementary failure modes: visual evidence detects target-level mismatches, while textual reasoning reveals dangerous intent behind visually innocuous controls. Across controlled attacks, real GUI screenshots, and agent traces, the combined guardrail consistently outperforms either channel alone. Our results suggest that CUA safety requires not only better action generation, but independent verification of what the agent believes it is clicking and why. Materials are provided\footnote{Model, benchmark, and code: https://github.com/vllm-project/semantic-router}.

Video-LLMs are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications but are vulnerable to Energy-Latency Attacks (ELAs) that exhaust computational resources. Current image-centric methods fail because temporal aggregation mechanisms dilute individual frame perturbations. Additionally, real-time demands make instance-wise optimization impractical for continuous video streams. We introduce VidDoS, which is the first universal ELA framework tailored for Video-LLMs. Our method leverages universal optimization to create instance-agnostic triggers that require no inference-time gradient calculation. We achieve this through $\textit{masked teacher forcing}$ to steer models toward expensive target sequences, combined with a $\textit{refusal penalty}$ and $\textit{early-termination suppression}$ to override conciseness priors. Testing across three mainstream Video-LLMs and three video datasets, which include video question answering and autonomous driving scenarios, shows extreme degradation. VidDoS induces a token expansion of more than 205$\times$ and inflates the inference latency by more than 15$\times$ relative to clean baselines. Simulations of real-time autonomous driving streams further reveal that this induced latency leads to critical safety violations. We urge the community to recognize and mitigate these high-hazard ELA in Video-LLMs.

Current research on operator control of Large Language Models improves model robustness against adversarial attacks and misbehavior by training on preference examples, prompting, and input/output filtering. Despite good results, LLMs remain susceptible to abuse, and jailbreak probability increases with context length. There is a need for robust LLM security guarantees in long-context situations. We propose control sentences inserted into the LLM context as invasive context engineering to partially solve the problem. We suggest this technique can be generalized to the Chain-of-Thought process to prevent scheming. Invasive Context Engineering does not rely on LLM training, avoiding data shortage pitfalls which arise in training models for long context situations.

Current Large Language Model alignment research mostly focuses on improving model robustness against adversarial attacks and misbehavior by training on examples and prompting. Research has shown that LLM jailbreak probability increases with the size of the user input or conversation length. There is a lack of appropriate research into means of strengthening alignment which also scale with user input length. We propose interruptions as a possible solution to this problem. Interruptions are control sentences added to the user input approximately every x tokens for some arbitrary x. We suggest that this can be generalized to the Chain-of-Thought process to prevent scheming.

Language model finetuning often results in learning undesirable traits in combination with desired ones. To address this, we propose inoculation prompting: modifying finetuning data by prepending a short system-prompt instruction that deliberately elicits the undesirable trait. At test time, we evaluate without the instruction; inoculated models have much lower expression of the trait than models trained with unmodified training data. Inoculation is selective: in a toy setting where assistant responses are always in Spanish and ALL-CAPS, an appropriate inoculation (e.g., ``You always speak in Spanish.'') teaches the model to capitalize responses while still responding in English. We find that inoculation is also effective across several additional settings: reducing emergent misalignment (EM) from task-specific finetuning, defending against backdoor injections, and mitigating the transmission of traits via subliminal learning. Follow-up analysis suggests a mechanism: making a trait less surprising via inoculation reduces optimization pressure to globally update the model, thereby reducing the degree of generalization. Our analysis relates to prior work on EM: inoculation explains prior findings that educational contexts mitigate EM from insecure code. Beyond demonstrating a simple and effective technique for selective learning, our results contribute to a better conceptual understanding of how and why language models generalize.

Web agents powered by large language models (LLMs) must process lengthy web page observations to complete user goals; these pages often exceed tens of thousands of tokens. This saturates context limits and increases computational cost processing; moreover, processing full pages exposes agents to security risks such as prompt injection. Existing pruning strategies either discard relevant content or retain irrelevant context, leading to suboptimal action prediction. We introduce FocusAgent, a simple yet effective approach that leverages a lightweight LLM retriever to extract the most relevant lines from accessibility tree (AxTree) observations, guided by task goals. By pruning noisy and irrelevant content, FocusAgent enables efficient reasoning while reducing vulnerability to injection attacks. Experiments on WorkArena and WebArena benchmarks show that FocusAgent matches the performance of strong baselines, while reducing observation size by over 50%. Furthermore, a variant of FocusAgent significantly reduces the success rate of prompt-injection attacks, including banner and pop-up attacks, while maintaining task success performance in attack-free settings. Our results highlight that targeted LLM-based retrieval is a practical and robust strategy for building web agents that are efficient, effective, and secure.

Deepfakes, synthetic media created using advanced AI techniques, pose a growing threat to information integrity, particularly in politically sensitive contexts. This challenge is amplified by the increasing realism of modern generative models, which our human perception study confirms are often indistinguishable from real images. Yet, existing deepfake detection benchmarks rely on outdated generators or narrowly scoped datasets (e.g., single-face imagery), limiting their utility for real-world detection. To address these gaps, we present OpenFake, a large politically grounded dataset specifically crafted for benchmarking against modern generative models with high realism, and designed to remain extensible through an innovative crowdsourced adversarial platform that continually integrates new hard examples. OpenFake comprises nearly four million total images: three million real images paired with descriptive captions and almost one million synthetic counterparts from state-of-the-art proprietary and open-source models. Detectors trained on OpenFake achieve near-perfect in-distribution performance, strong generalization to unseen generators, and high accuracy on a curated in-the-wild social media test set, significantly outperforming models trained on existing datasets. Overall, we demonstrate that with high-quality and continually updated benchmarks, automatic deepfake detection is both feasible and effective in real-world settings.