Most safety evaluations of large language models (LLMs) remain anchored in English. Translation is often used as a shortcut to probe multilingual behavior, but it rarely captures the full picture, especially when harmful intent or structure morphs across languages. Some types of harm survive translation almost intact, while others distort or disappear. To study this effect, we introduce CompositeHarm, a translation-based benchmark designed to examine how safety alignment holds up as both syntax and semantics shift. It combines two complementary English datasets, AttaQ, which targets structured adversarial attacks, and MMSafetyBench, which covers contextual, real-world harms, and extends them into six languages: English, Hindi, Assamese, Marathi, Kannada, and Gujarati. Using three large models, we find that attack success rates rise sharply in Indic languages, especially under adversarial syntax, while contextual harms transfer more moderately. To ensure scalability and energy efficiency, our study adopts lightweight inference strategies inspired by edge-AI design principles, reducing redundant evaluation passes while preserving cross-lingual fidelity. This design makes large-scale multilingual safety testing both computationally feasible and environmentally conscious. Overall, our results show that translated benchmarks are a necessary first step, but not a sufficient one, toward building grounded, resource-aware, language-adaptive safety systems.

The rapid evolution of end-to-end AI music generation poses an escalating threat to artistic authenticity and copyright, demanding detection methods that can keep pace. While foundational, existing models like SpecTTTra falter when faced with the diverse and rapidly advancing ecosystem of new generators, exhibiting significant performance drops on out-of-distribution (OOD) content. This generalization failure highlights a critical gap: the need for more challenging benchmarks and more robust detection architectures. To address this, we first introduce Melody or Machine (MoM), a new large-scale benchmark of over 130,000 songs (6,665 hours). MoM is the most diverse dataset to date, built with a mix of open and closed-source models and a curated OOD test set designed specifically to foster the development of truly generalizable detectors. Alongside this benchmark, we introduce CLAM, a novel dual-stream detection architecture. We hypothesize that subtle, machine-induced inconsistencies between vocal and instrumental elements, often imperceptible in a mixed signal, offer a powerful tell-tale sign of synthesis. CLAM is designed to test this hypothesis by employing two distinct pre-trained audio encoders (MERT and Wave2Vec2) to create parallel representations of the audio. These representations are fused by a learnable cross-aggregation module that models their inter-dependencies. The model is trained with a dual-loss objective: a standard binary cross-entropy loss for classification, complemented by a contrastive triplet loss which trains the model to distinguish between coherent and artificially mismatched stream pairings, enhancing its sensitivity to synthetic artifacts without presuming a simple feature alignment. CLAM establishes a new state-of-the-art in synthetic music forensics. It achieves an F1 score of 0.925 on our challenging MoM benchmark.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into web-based systems for content summarization, yet their susceptibility to prompt injection attacks remains a pressing concern. In this study, we explore how non-visible HTML elements such as <meta>, aria-label, and alt attributes can be exploited to embed adversarial instructions without altering the visible content of a webpage. We introduce a novel dataset comprising 280 static web pages, evenly divided between clean and adversarial injected versions, crafted using diverse HTML-based strategies. These pages are processed through a browser automation pipeline to extract both raw HTML and rendered text, closely mimicking real-world LLM deployment scenarios. We evaluate two state-of-the-art open-source models, Llama 4 Scout (Meta) and Gemma 9B IT (Google), on their ability to summarize this content. Using both lexical (ROUGE-L) and semantic (SBERT cosine similarity) metrics, along with manual annotations, we assess the impact of these covert injections. Our findings reveal that over 29% of injected samples led to noticeable changes in the Llama 4 Scout summaries, while Gemma 9B IT showed a lower, yet non-trivial, success rate of 15%. These results highlight a critical and largely overlooked vulnerability in LLM driven web pipelines, where hidden adversarial content can subtly manipulate model outputs. Our work offers a reproducible framework and benchmark for evaluating HTML-based prompt injection and underscores the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies in LLM applications involving web content.