Modern generative models risk overfitting and unintentionally memorizing rare training examples, which can be extracted by adversaries or inflate benchmark performance. We propose Generative Data Cartography (GenDataCarto), a data-centric framework that assigns each pretraining sample a difficulty score (early-epoch loss) and a memorization score (frequency of ``forget events''), then partitions examples into four quadrants to guide targeted pruning and up-/down-weighting. We prove that our memorization score lower-bounds classical influence under smoothness assumptions and that down-weighting high-memorization hotspots provably decreases the generalization gap via uniform stability bounds. Empirically, GenDataCarto reduces synthetic canary extraction success by over 40\% at just 10\% data pruning, while increasing validation perplexity by less than 0.5\%. These results demonstrate that principled data interventions can dramatically mitigate leakage with minimal cost to generative performance.

To mitigate the potential harms of Large Language Models (LLMs)generated text, researchers have proposed watermarking, a process of embedding detectable signals within text. With watermarking, we can always accurately detect LLM-generated texts. However, recent findings suggest that these techniques often negatively affect the quality of the generated texts, and adversarial attacks can strip the watermarking signals, causing the texts to possibly evade detection. These findings have created resistance in the wide adoption of watermarking by LLM creators. Finally, to encourage adoption, we evaluate the robustness of several watermarking techniques to adversarial attacks by comparing paraphrasing and back translation (i.e., English $\to$ another language $\to$ English) attacks; and their ability to preserve quality and writing style of the unwatermarked texts by using linguistic metrics to capture quality and writing style of texts. Our results suggest that these watermarking techniques preserve semantics, deviate from the writing style of the unwatermarked texts, and are susceptible to adversarial attacks, especially for the back translation attack.