Advanced deepfake technologies are blurring the lines between real and fake, presenting both revolutionary opportunities and alarming threats. While it unlocks novel applications in fields like entertainment and education, its malicious use has sparked urgent ethical and societal concerns ranging from identity theft to the dissemination of misinformation. To tackle these challenges, feature analysis using frequency features has emergedas a promising direction for deepfake detection. However, oneaspect that has been overlooked so far is that existing methodstend to concentrate on one or a few specific frequency domains,which risks overfitting to particular artifacts and significantlyundermines their robustness when facing diverse forgery patterns. Another underexplored aspect we observe is that different features often attend to the same forged region, resulting in redundant feature representations and limiting the diversity of the extracted clues. This may undermine the ability of a model to capture complementary information across different facets, thereby compromising its generalization capability to diverse manipulations. In this paper, we seek to tackle these challenges from two aspects: (1) we propose a triple-branch network that jointly captures spatial and frequency features by learning from both original image and image reconstructed by different frequency channels, and (2) we mathematically derive feature decoupling and fusion losses grounded in the mutual information theory, which enhances the model to focus on task-relevant features across the original image and the image reconstructed by different frequency channels. Extensive experiments on six large-scale benchmark datasets demonstrate that our method consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance. Our code is released at https://github.com/injooker/Unveiling Deepfake.

LLM-based web agents have become increasingly popular for their utility in daily life and work. However, they exhibit critical vulnerabilities when processing malicious URLs: accepting a disguised malicious URL enables subsequent access to unsafe webpages, which can cause severe damage to service providers and users. Despite this risk, no benchmark currently targets this emerging threat. To address this gap, we propose MalURLBench, the first benchmark for evaluating LLMs' vulnerabilities to malicious URLs. MalURLBench contains 61,845 attack instances spanning 10 real-world scenarios and 7 categories of real malicious websites. Experiments with 12 popular LLMs reveal that existing models struggle to detect elaborately disguised malicious URLs. We further identify and analyze key factors that impact attack success rates and propose URLGuard, a lightweight defense module. We believe this work will provide a foundational resource for advancing the security of web agents. Our code is available at https://github.com/JiangYingEr/MalURLBench.