Recommendation systems have become central gatekeepers of online information, shaping user behaviour across a wide range of activities. In response, users increasingly organize and coordinate to steer algorithmic outcomes toward diverse goals, such as promoting relevant content or limiting harmful material, relying on platform affordances -- such as likes, reviews, or ratings. While these mechanisms can serve beneficial purposes, they can also be leveraged for adversarial manipulation, particularly in systems where such feedback directly informs safety guarantees. In this paper, we study this vulnerability in recently proposed risk-controlling recommender systems, which use binary user feedback (e.g., "Not Interested") to provably limit exposure to unwanted content via conformal risk control. We empirically demonstrate that their reliance on aggregate feedback signals makes them inherently susceptible to coordinated adversarial user behaviour. Using data from a large-scale online video-sharing platform, we show that a small coordinated group (comprising only 1% of the user population) can induce up to a 20% degradation in nDCG for non-adversarial users by exploiting the affordances provided by risk-controlling recommender systems. We evaluate simple, realistic attack strategies that require little to no knowledge of the underlying recommendation algorithm and find that, while coordinated users can significantly harm overall recommendation quality, they cannot selectively suppress specific content groups through reporting alone. Finally, we propose a mitigation strategy that shifts guarantees from the group level to the user level, showing empirically how it can reduce the impact of adversarial coordinated behaviour while ensuring personalized safety for individuals.

Explanations provided by Self-explainable Graph Neural Networks (SE-GNNs) are fundamental for understanding the model's inner workings and for identifying potential misuse of sensitive attributes. Although recent works have highlighted that these explanations can be suboptimal and potentially misleading, a characterization of their failure cases is unavailable. In this work, we identify a critical failure of SE-GNN explanations: explanations can be unambiguously unrelated to how the SE-GNNs infer labels. We show that, on the one hand, many SE-GNNs can achieve optimal true risk while producing these degenerate explanations, and on the other, most faithfulness metrics can fail to identify these failure modes. Our empirical analysis reveals that degenerate explanations can be maliciously planted (allowing an attacker to hide the use of sensitive attributes) and can also emerge naturally, highlighting the need for reliable auditing. To address this, we introduce a novel faithfulness metric that reliably marks degenerate explanations as unfaithful, in both malicious and natural settings. Our code is available in the supplemental.