Tool-using LLM agents increasingly coordinate real workloads by selecting and chaining third-party tools based on text-visible metadata such as tool names, descriptions, and return messages. We show that this convenience creates a supply-chain attack surface: a malicious MCP tool server can be co-registered alongside normal tools and induce overthinking loops, where individually trivial or plausible tool calls compose into cyclic trajectories that inflate end-to-end tokens and latency without any single step looking abnormal. We formalize this as a structural overthinking attack, distinguishable from token-level verbosity, and implement 14 malicious tools across three servers that trigger repetition, forced refinement, and distraction. Across heterogeneous registries and multiple tool-capable models, the attack causes severe resource amplification (up to $142.4\times$ tokens) and can degrade task outcomes. Finally, we find that decoding-time concision controls do not reliably prevent loop induction, suggesting defenses should reason about tool-call structure rather than tokens alone.

Since deepfakes generated by advanced generative models have rapidly posed serious threats, existing audiovisual deepfake detection approaches struggle to generalize to unseen forgeries. We propose a novel reference-aware audiovisual deepfake detection method, called Referee. Speaker-specific cues from only one-shot examples are leveraged to detect manipulations beyond spatiotemporal artifacts. By matching and aligning identity-related queries from reference and target content into cross-modal features, Referee jointly reasons about audiovisual synchrony and identity consistency. Extensive experiments on FakeAVCeleb, FaceForensics++, and KoDF demonstrate that Referee achieves state-of-the-art performance on cross-dataset and cross-language evaluation protocols. Experimental results highlight the importance of cross-modal identity verification for future deepfake detection. The code is available at https://github.com/ewha-mmai/referee.