Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves the reliability of large language model applications by grounding generation in retrieved evidence, but it also introduces a new attack surface: corpus poisoning. In this setting, an adversary injects or edits passages so that they are ranked into the Top-$K$ results for target queries and then affect downstream generation. Existing defences against corpus poisoning often rely on content filtering, auxiliary models, or generator-side reasoning, which can make deployment more difficult. We propose ProGRank, a post hoc, training-free retriever-side defence for dense-retriever RAG. ProGRank stress-tests each query--passage pair under mild randomized perturbations and extracts probe gradients from a small fixed parameter subset of the retriever. From these signals, it derives two instability signals, representational consistency and dispersion risk, and combines them with a score gate in a reranking step. ProGRank preserves the original passage content, requires no retraining, and also supports a surrogate-based variant when the deployed retriever is unavailable. Extensive experiments across three datasets, three dense retriever backbones, representative corpus poisoning attacks, and both retrieval-stage and end-to-end settings show that ProGRank provides stronger defence performance and a favorable robustness--utility trade-off. It also remains competitive under adaptive evasive attacks.

Randomized smoothing (RS) is one of the prominent techniques to ensure the correctness of machine learning models, where point-wise robustness certificates can be derived analytically. While RS is well understood for classification, its application to generative models is unclear, since their outputs are sequences rather than labels. We resolve this by connecting generative outputs to an oracle classification task and showing that RS can still be enabled: the final response can be classified as a discrete action (e.g., service-robot commands in VLAs), as harmful vs. harmless (content moderation or toxicity detection in VLMs), or even applying oracles to cluster answers into semantically equivalent ones. Provided that the error rate for the oracle classifier comparison is bounded, we develop the theory that associates the number of samples with the corresponding robustness radius. We further derive improved scaling laws analytically relating the certified radius and accuracy to the number of samples, showing that the earlier result of 2 to 3 orders of magnitude fewer samples sufficing with minimal loss remains valid even under weaker assumptions. Together, these advances make robustness certification both well-defined and computationally feasible for state-of-the-art VLMs, as validated against recent jailbreak-style adversarial attacks.