Can the privacy vulnerability of individual data points be assessed without retraining models or explicitly simulating attacks? We answer affirmatively by showing that exposure to membership inference attack (MIA) is fundamentally governed by a data point's influence on the learned model. We formalize this in the linear setting by establishing a theoretical correspondence between individual MIA risk and the leverage score, identifying it as a principled metric for vulnerability. This characterization explains how data-dependent sensitivity translates into exposure, without the computational burden of training shadow models. Building on this, we propose a computationally efficient generalization of the leverage score for deep learning. Empirical evaluations confirm a strong correlation between the proposed score and MIA success, validating this metric as a practical surrogate for individual privacy risk assessment.

With the widespread use of large language models (LLMs), many researchers have turned their attention to detecting text generated by them. However, there is no consistent or precise definition of their target, namely "LLM-generated text". Differences in usage scenarios and the diversity of LLMs further increase the difficulty of detection. What is commonly regarded as the detecting target usually represents only a subset of the text that LLMs can potentially produce. Human edits to LLM outputs, together with the subtle influences that LLMs exert on their users, are blurring the line between LLM-generated and human-written text. Existing benchmarks and evaluation approaches do not adequately address the various conditions in real-world detector applications. Hence, the numerical results of detectors are often misunderstood, and their significance is diminishing. Therefore, detectors remain useful under specific conditions, but their results should be interpreted only as references rather than decisive indicators.