Transient Turn Injection: Exposing Stateless Multi-Turn Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models
Naheed Rayhan 1, Sohely Jahan 2
Published on arXiv
2604.21860
Prompt Injection
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM01
Key Finding
Discovers previously unknown model-specific vulnerabilities across state-of-the-art LLMs, with only select architectures showing substantial inherent robustness to multi-turn stateless jailbreak attacks
Transient Turn Injection (TTI)
Novel technique introduced
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into sensitive workflows, raising the stakes for adversarial robustness and safety. This paper introduces Transient Turn Injection(TTI), a new multi-turn attack technique that systematically exploits stateless moderation by distributing adversarial intent across isolated interactions. TTI leverages automated attacker agents powered by large language models to iteratively test and evade policy enforcement in both commercial and open-source LLMs, marking a departure from conventional jailbreak approaches that typically depend on maintaining persistent conversational context. Our extensive evaluation across state-of-the-art models-including those from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Meta, and prominent open-source alternatives-uncovers significant variations in resilience to TTI attacks, with only select architectures exhibiting substantial inherent robustness. Our automated blackbox evaluation framework also uncovers previously unknown model specific vulnerabilities and attack surface patterns, especially within medical and high stakes domains. We further compare TTI against established adversarial prompting methods and detail practical mitigation strategies, such as session level context aggregation and deep alignment approaches. Our study underscores the urgent need for holistic, context aware defenses and continuous adversarial testing to future proof LLM deployments against evolving multi-turn threats.
Key Contributions
- Novel Transient Turn Injection (TTI) attack technique exploiting stateless moderation in multi-turn LLM conversations
- Automated black-box evaluation framework using LLM-powered attacker agents to systematically test multi-turn jailbreak resilience
- Comprehensive evaluation across commercial (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Meta) and open-source LLMs revealing significant variation in robustness to multi-turn attacks