Securing Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Taxonomy of Attacks, Defenses, and Future Directions

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) significantly enhances large language models (LLMs) but introduces novel security risks through external knowledge access. While existing studies cover various RAG vulnerabilities, they often conflate inherent LLM risks with those specifically introduced by RAG. In this paper, we propose that secure RAG is fundamentally about the security of the external knowledge-access pipeline. We establish an operational boundary to separate inherent LLM flaws from RAG-introduced or RAG-amplified threats. Guided by this perspective, we abstract the RAG workflow into six stages and organize the literature around three trust boundaries and four primary security surfaces, including pre-retrieval knowledge corruption, retrieval-time access manipulation, downstream context exploitation, and knowledge exfiltration. By systematically reviewing the corresponding attacks, defenses, remediation mechanisms, and evaluation benchmarks, we reveal that current defenses remain largely reactive and fragmented. Finally, we discuss these gaps and highlight future directions toward layered, boundary-aware protection across the entire knowledge-access lifecycle.

Key Contributions

Establishes operational boundary separating inherent LLM risks from RAG-introduced/amplified threats
Organizes RAG security literature around four security surfaces: pre-retrieval corruption, retrieval manipulation, context exploitation, and knowledge exfiltration
Systematically reviews attacks, defenses, remediation mechanisms, and benchmarks for secure external knowledge access