Your Agent is More Brittle Than You Think: Uncovering Indirect Injection Vulnerabilities in Agentic LLMs
Wenhui Zhu 1, Xuanzhao Dong 1, Xiwen Chen 2, Rui Cai 3, Peijie Qiu 4, Zhipeng Wang 5, Oana Frunza 2, Shao Tang 6, Jindong Gu 7, Yalin Wang 1
Published on arXiv
2604.03870
Prompt Injection
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM01
Insecure Plugin Design
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM07
Excessive Agency
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM08
Key Finding
Advanced IPI attacks bypass nearly all baseline defenses; RepE-based detection intercepts unauthorized actions before execution with high accuracy across diverse LLM backbones
RepE-based circuit breaker
Novel technique introduced
The rapid deployment of open-source frameworks has significantly advanced the development of modern multi-agent systems. However, expanded action spaces, including uncontrolled privilege exposure and hidden inter-system interactions, pose severe security challenges. Specifically, Indirect Prompt Injections (IPI), which conceal malicious instructions within third-party content, can trigger unauthorized actions such as data exfiltration during normal operations. While current security evaluations predominantly rely on isolated single-turn benchmarks, the systemic vulnerabilities of these agents within complex dynamic environments remain critically underexplored. To bridge this gap, we systematically evaluate six defense strategies against four sophisticated IPI attack vectors across nine LLM backbones. Crucially, we conduct our evaluation entirely within dynamic multi-step tool-calling environments to capture the true attack surface of modern autonomous agents. Moving beyond binary success rates, our multidimensional analysis reveals a pronounced fragility. Advanced injections successfully bypass nearly all baseline defenses, and some surface-level mitigations even produce counterproductive side effects. Furthermore, while agents execute malicious instructions almost instantaneously, their internal states exhibit abnormally high decision entropy. Motivated by this latent hesitation, we investigate Representation Engineering (RepE) as a robust detection strategy. By extracting hidden states at the tool-input position, we revealed that the RepE-based circuit breaker successfully identifies and intercepts unauthorized actions before the agent commits to them, achieving high detection accuracy across diverse LLM backbones. This study exposes the limitations of current IPI defenses and provides a highly practical paradigm for building resilient multi-agent architectures.
Key Contributions
- Systematic evaluation of 6 defense strategies against 4 IPI attack vectors across 9 LLM backbones in dynamic multi-step tool-calling environments
- Discovery that advanced injections bypass nearly all baseline defenses, with some defenses producing counterproductive side effects
- Representation Engineering (RepE)-based circuit breaker that detects unauthorized actions via hidden state analysis at tool-input position, achieving high detection accuracy