SOMP: Scalable Gradient Inversion for Large Language Models via Subspace-Guided Orthogonal Matching Pursuit
Yibo Li 1, Qiongxiu Li 2
Published on arXiv
2603.16761
Model Inversion Attack
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML03
Sensitive Information Disclosure
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM06
Key Finding
Achieves 2.4x higher reconstruction fidelity than baselines at batch size 16 and recovers meaningful text even at extreme aggregation (B=128)
SOMP
Novel technique introduced
Gradient inversion attacks reveal that private training text can be reconstructed from shared gradients, posing a privacy risk to large language models (LLMs). While prior methods perform well in small-batch settings, scaling to larger batch sizes and longer sequences remains challenging due to severe signal mixing, high computational cost, and degraded fidelity. We present SOMP (Subspace-Guided Orthogonal Matching Pursuit), a scalable gradient inversion framework that casts text recovery from aggregated gradients as a sparse signal recovery problem. Our key insight is that aggregated transformer gradients retain exploitable head-wise geometric structure together with sample-level sparsity. SOMP leverages these properties to progressively narrow the search space and disentangle mixed signals without exhaustive search. Experiments across multiple LLM families, model scales, and five languages show that SOMP consistently outperforms prior methods in the aggregated-gradient regime.For long sequences at batch size B=16, SOMP achieves substantially higher reconstruction fidelity than strong baselines, while remaining computationally competitive. Even under extreme aggregation (up to B=128), SOMP still recovers meaningful text, suggesting that privacy leakage can persist in regimes where prior attacks become much less effective.
Key Contributions
- Reformulates gradient inversion as sparse signal recovery problem exploiting head-wise geometric structure of transformer gradients
- Scales to large batch sizes (B=16-128) and long sequences where prior methods fail
- Achieves 2.4x improvement in reconstruction fidelity over baselines at batch size 16 while remaining computationally competitive
🛡️ Threat Analysis
Paper demonstrates reconstruction of private training data from shared gradients in federated learning — a model inversion attack where the adversary (honest-but-curious server) recovers text that models were trained on by exploiting gradient structure.