SPOILER: TEE-Shielded DNN Partitioning of On-Device Secure Inference with Poison Learning
Donghwa Kang 1, Hojun Choe 1, Doohyun Kim 1, Hyeongboo Baek 2, Brent ByungHoon Kang 1
Published on arXiv
2603.06263
Model Theft
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML05
Key Finding
SPOILER achieves state-of-the-art security-latency-accuracy trade-offs for TEE-shielded DNN partitioning on both CNNs and Transformers deployed on edge devices.
SPOILER
Novel technique introduced
Deploying deep neural networks (DNNs) on edge devices exposes valuable intellectual property to model-stealing attacks. While TEE-shielded DNN partitioning (TSDP) mitigates this by isolating sensitive computations, existing paradigms fail to simultaneously satisfy privacy and efficiency. The training-before-partition paradigm suffers from intrinsic privacy leakage, whereas the partition-before-training paradigm incurs severe latency due to structural dependencies that hinder parallel execution. To overcome these limitations, we propose SPOILER, a novel search-before-training framework that fundamentally decouples the TEE sub-network from the backbone via hardware-aware neural architecture search (NAS). SPOILER identifies a lightweight TEE architecture strictly optimized for hardware constraints, maximizing parallel efficiency. Furthermore, we introduce self-poisoning learning to enforce logical isolation, rendering the exposed backbone functionally incoherent without the TEE component. Extensive experiments on CNNs and Transformers demonstrate that SPOILER achieves state-of-the-art trade-offs between security, latency, and accuracy.
Key Contributions
- Search-before-training framework (SPOILER) that decouples the TEE sub-network from the backbone via hardware-aware neural architecture search, maximizing parallel execution efficiency on edge devices
- Self-poisoning learning technique that enforces logical isolation by rendering the exposed backbone functionally incoherent without the TEE-protected component, preventing usable model extraction
- Empirical validation on CNNs and Transformers showing state-of-the-art trade-offs among security, inference latency, and accuracy
🛡️ Threat Analysis
The entire framework is designed to prevent model-stealing attacks on edge devices: the TEE partitioning hides sensitive model components, and self-poisoning learning intentionally degrades the exposed backbone so that an adversary who extracts it cannot recover a functional model. This is a direct defense against model IP theft.