BadRSSD: Backdoor Attacks on Regularized Self-Supervised Diffusion Models
Jiayao Wang 1, Yiping Zhang 1, Mohammad Maruf Hasan 1, Xiaoying Lei 1, Jiale Zhang 1, Junwu Zhu 1, Qilin Wu 2, Dongfang Zhao 3
Published on arXiv
2603.01019
Model Poisoning
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML10
Key Finding
BadRSSD substantially outperforms existing backdoor attacks in FID and MSE metrics across multiple architectures while successfully evading state-of-the-art backdoor defenses
BadRSSD
Novel technique introduced
Self-supervised diffusion models learn high-quality visual representations via latent space denoising. However, their representation layer poses a distinct threat: unlike traditional attacks targeting generative outputs, its unconstrained latent semantic space allows for stealthy backdoors, permitting malicious control upon triggering. In this paper, we propose BadRSSD, the first backdoor attack targeting the representation layer of self-supervised diffusion models. Specifically, it hijacks the semantic representations of poisoned samples with triggers in Principal Component Analysis (PCA) space toward those of a target image, then controls the denoising trajectory during diffusion by applying coordinated constraints across latent, pixel, and feature distribution spaces to steer the model toward generating the specified target. Additionally, we integrate representation dispersion regularization into the constraint framework to maintain feature space uniformity, significantly enhancing attack stealth. This approach preserves normal model functionality (high utility) while achieving precise target generation upon trigger activation (high specificity). Experiments on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that BadRSSD substantially outperforms existing attacks in both FID and MSE metrics, reliably establishing backdoors across different architectures and configurations, and effectively resisting state-of-the-art backdoor defenses.
Key Contributions
- First backdoor attack targeting the representation layer of self-supervised diffusion models, manipulating PCA-space semantics of triggered samples toward a target image
- Coordinated multi-space constraint framework (latent, pixel, and feature distribution) that steers denoising trajectories to generate attacker-specified outputs on trigger activation
- Representation dispersion regularization integrated into the constraint framework to preserve feature space uniformity, significantly improving attack stealth while resisting SOTA defenses
🛡️ Threat Analysis
BadRSSD is a trigger-based backdoor attack: poisoned samples with triggers cause the diffusion model to generate a specific target image while maintaining normal behavior otherwise — the defining characteristic of a neural trojan. The attack embeds hidden behavior in the representation layer activated only by a specific trigger, directly fitting ML10.