defense 2026

Verifier-Bound Communication for LLM Agents: Certified Bounds on Covert Signaling

Om Tailor

0 citations

α

Published on arXiv

2603.00381

Excessive Agency

OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM08

Key Finding

In strict verifier-bound lanes, decoder advantage is certified at 0.0000 with MI proxy 0.0636 bits, demonstrating that online fail-closed admission semantics provide qualitatively stronger covert-channel bounds than audit-only or bottleneck-only controls.

CLBC (Certified Leakage-Bounded Communication)

Novel technique introduced


Colluding language-model agents can hide coordination in messages that remain policy-compliant at the surface level. We present CLBC, a protocol where generation and admission are separated: a message is admitted to transcript state only if a small verifier accepts a proof-bound envelope under a pinned predicate $Π$. The predicate binds policy hash, public randomness schedule, transcript chaining, latent schema constraints, canonical metadata/tool fields, and deterministic rejection codes. We show how this protocol yields an upper bound on transcript leakage in terms of latent leakage plus explicit residual channels, derive adaptive composition guarantees, and state a semantic lower bound when policy-valid alternatives remain choosable. We report extensive empirically grounded evidence: aggregate evaluation satisfies all prespecified thresholds; strict lane decoder advantage is bounded at 0.0000 with MI proxy 0.0636; adaptive-colluder stress tests remain below attacker thresholds; and baseline separation shows large gaps between reject-by-default semantics and audit-only controls. We further quantify operational tradeoffs. Strict full-proof mode has median turn latency 27.53s (p95 28.08s), while sampled proving reduces non-proved-turn latency to 0.327ms. The central finding is that bottlenecks alone are insufficient: security claims depend on verifiable admission semantics that are online, deterministic, and fail-closed.


Key Contributions

  • CLBC protocol that separates message generation from admission: messages are only admitted to transcript state if a verifier accepts a proof-bound envelope under a pinned predicate binding policy hash, randomness schedule, transcript chaining, latent schema constraints, and tool/metadata fields
  • Formal upper bound on transcript leakage as latent leakage plus explicit residual channels, with adaptive composition guarantees and a semantic lower bound for tasks with multiple policy-valid alternatives
  • Empirical evaluation showing near-zero decoder advantage (0.0000) with MI proxy 0.0636 bits in strict lanes, alongside latency characterization (median 27.53s full-proof vs 0.327ms sampled proving)

🛡️ Threat Analysis


Details

Domains
nlp
Model Types
llm
Threat Tags
inference_time
Applications
llm multi-agent systemsagentic ai frameworkstool-augmented llm pipelines