Sparse Autoencoders are Capable LLM Jailbreak Mitigators
Yannick Assogba 1, Jacopo Cortellazzi 1, Javier Abad 2, Pau Rodriguez 1, Xavier Suau 1, Arno Blaas 1
1 Apple
Published on arXiv
2602.12418
Prompt Injection
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM01
Key Finding
CC-Delta achieves comparable or better safety-utility tradeoffs than dense latent space baselines across four aligned LLMs and twelve jailbreak attacks, with particular gains against out-of-distribution attacks.
CC-Delta (Context-Conditioned Delta Steering)
Novel technique introduced
Jailbreak attacks remain a persistent threat to large language model safety. We propose Context-Conditioned Delta Steering (CC-Delta), an SAE-based defense that identifies jailbreak-relevant sparse features by comparing token-level representations of the same harmful request with and without jailbreak context. Using paired harmful/jailbreak prompts, CC-Delta selects features via statistical testing and applies inference-time mean-shift steering in SAE latent space. Across four aligned instruction-tuned models and twelve jailbreak attacks, CC-Delta achieves comparable or better safety-utility tradeoffs than baseline defenses operating in dense latent space. In particular, our method clearly outperforms dense mean-shift steering on all four models, and particularly against out-of-distribution attacks, showing that steering in sparse SAE feature space offers advantages over steering in dense activation space for jailbreak mitigation. Our results suggest off-the-shelf SAEs trained for interpretability can be repurposed as practical jailbreak defenses without task-specific training.
Key Contributions
- Context-Conditioned Delta Steering (CC-Delta): identifies jailbreak-relevant SAE features by contrasting token-level representations of harmful requests with vs. without jailbreak context using statistical testing.
- Demonstrates that steering in sparse SAE feature space outperforms dense activation steering on all four aligned instruction-tuned models, especially against out-of-distribution jailbreak attacks.
- Shows that off-the-shelf interpretability SAEs can be repurposed as practical jailbreak defenses without any task-specific retraining.