defense 2026

Collaborative Threshold Watermarking

Tameem Bakr , Anish Ambreth , Nils Lukas

0 citations · 40 references · arXiv (Cornell University)

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Published on arXiv

2602.10765

Model Theft

OWASP ML Top 10 — ML05

Key Finding

Watermark remains detectable (z≥4) at K=128 clients under adaptive fine-tuning attacks, where a naive per-client baseline falls below the detection threshold at K≥16.

(t,K)-Threshold Watermarking

Novel technique introduced


In federated learning (FL), $K$ clients jointly train a model without sharing raw data. Because each participant invests data and compute, clients need mechanisms to later prove the provenance of a jointly trained model. Model watermarking embeds a hidden signal in the weights, but naive approaches either do not scale with many clients as per-client watermarks dilute as $K$ grows, or give any individual client the ability to verify and potentially remove the watermark. We introduce $(t,K)$-threshold watermarking: clients collaboratively embed a shared watermark during training, while only coalitions of at least $t$ clients can reconstruct the watermark key and verify a suspect model. We secret-share the watermark key $τ$ so that coalitions of fewer than $t$ clients cannot reconstruct it, and verification can be performed without revealing $τ$ in the clear. We instantiate our protocol in the white-box setting and evaluate on image classification. Our watermark remains detectable at scale ($K=128$) with minimal accuracy loss and stays above the detection threshold ($z\ge 4$) under attacks including adaptive fine-tuning using up to 20% of the training data.


Key Contributions

  • First (t,K)-threshold watermarking protocol for FL combining Shamir secret sharing with secure aggregation so only coalitions of ≥t clients can verify ownership
  • Verification scheme that computes a calibrated z-score test statistic directly from secret shares without reconstructing the key τ in the clear
  • Demonstrated scalability to K=128 clients with minimal accuracy loss and robustness to adaptive fine-tuning attacks using up to 20% of training data

🛡️ Threat Analysis

Model Theft

Watermark is embedded in model WEIGHTS to prove ownership and provenance of a jointly trained FL model — classic model IP protection. The scheme defends against unauthorized redistribution by ensuring only a coalition of ≥t clients can verify or reconstruct the watermark key, directly addressing model theft in the federated setting.


Details

Domains
visionfederated-learning
Model Types
cnnfederated
Threat Tags
white_boxtraining_time
Datasets
CIFAR-10CIFAR-100Tiny ImageNet
Applications
federated learningimage classificationmodel provenance verification