Deep Leakage with Generative Flow Matching Denoiser
Isaac Baglin , Xiatian Zhu , Simon Hadfield
Published on arXiv
2601.15049
Model Inversion Attack
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML03
Key Finding
The Flow Matching prior-guided attack consistently outperforms prior deep leakage methods across all similarity metrics and bypasses common FL defenses including noise injection, clipping, and sparsification.
Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for decentralized model training, yet it remains vulnerable to deep leakage (DL) attacks that reconstruct private client data from shared model updates. While prior DL methods have demonstrated varying levels of success, they often suffer from instability, limited fidelity, or poor robustness under realistic FL settings. We introduce a new DL attack that integrates a generative Flow Matching (FM) prior into the reconstruction process. By guiding optimization toward the distribution of realistic images (represented by a flow matching foundation model), our method enhances reconstruction fidelity without requiring knowledge of the private data. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets and target models demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms state-of-the-art attacks across pixel-level, perceptual, and feature-based similarity metrics. Crucially, the method remains effective across different training epochs, larger client batch sizes, and under common defenses such as noise injection, clipping, and sparsification. Our findings call for the development of new defense strategies that explicitly account for adversaries equipped with powerful generative priors.
Key Contributions
- Novel deep leakage attack that integrates a generative Flow Matching foundation model as a prior to guide gradient-based private data reconstruction toward realistic image distributions.
- Demonstrated consistent outperformance over state-of-the-art gradient inversion attacks across pixel-level (MSE/PSNR), perceptual (LPIPS/SSIM), and feature-based (FID) similarity metrics.
- Attack remains effective under realistic FL settings: multiple training epochs, larger client batch sizes, and common defenses (noise injection, gradient clipping, sparsification).
🛡️ Threat Analysis
The paper's primary contribution is a gradient leakage/reconstruction attack in federated learning: an adversary reconstructs private client training images from shared model gradients, which is the canonical ML03 threat. The generative Flow Matching prior is used to guide the reconstruction toward realistic images, directly improving the attack's data reconstruction fidelity.