INFA-Guard: Mitigating Malicious Propagation via Infection-Aware Safeguarding in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
Yijin Zhou 1,2,3, Xiaoya Lu 1,2, Dongrui Liu 2, Junchi Yan 1,3, Jing Shao 2
Published on arXiv
2601.14667
Prompt Injection
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM01
Excessive Agency
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM08
Key Finding
INFA-Guard reduces Attack Success Rate by an average of 33% across multi-agent system configurations while maintaining cross-model robustness and topological generalization.
INFA-Guard
Novel technique introduced
The rapid advancement of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has introduced significant security vulnerabilities, where malicious influence can propagate virally through inter-agent communication. Conventional safeguards often rely on a binary paradigm that strictly distinguishes between benign and attack agents, failing to account for infected agents i.e., benign entities converted by attack agents. In this paper, we propose Infection-Aware Guard, INFA-Guard, a novel defense framework that explicitly identifies and addresses infected agents as a distinct threat category. By leveraging infection-aware detection and topological constraints, INFA-Guard accurately localizes attack sources and infected ranges. During remediation, INFA-Guard replaces attackers and rehabilitates infected ones, avoiding malicious propagation while preserving topological integrity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that INFA-Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance, reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by an average of 33%, while exhibiting cross-model robustness, superior topological generalization, and high cost-effectiveness.
Key Contributions
- Introduces a novel threat category of 'infected agents' (benign agents converted by attackers) distinct from both clean and attack agents, enabling more accurate threat modeling in MAS
- Proposes infection-aware detection combined with topological constraints to localize attack sources and quantify infection spread across agent communication graphs
- Develops a remediation strategy that replaces attacker agents and rehabilitates infected ones, reducing ASR by an average of 33% while preserving topological integrity