The Model's Language Matters: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of LLMs
Abhishek Mishra 1,2,3, Antoine Boutet 1,2,3, Lucas Magnana 1,2,3
Published on arXiv
2510.08813
Model Inversion Attack
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML03
Membership Inference Attack
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML04
Sensitive Information Disclosure
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM06
Key Finding
Linguistic redundancy and tokenization granularity predict privacy vulnerability: Italian shows strongest training data leakage while morphologically richer French and Spanish are more resilient across all three attack types.
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed across multilingual applications that handle sensitive data, yet their scale and linguistic variability introduce major privacy risks. Mostly evaluated for English, this paper investigates how language structure affects privacy leakage in LLMs trained on English, Spanish, French, and Italian medical corpora. We quantify six linguistic indicators and evaluate three attack vectors: extraction, counterfactual memorization, and membership inference. Results show that privacy vulnerability scales with linguistic redundancy and tokenization granularity: Italian exhibits the strongest leakage, while English shows higher membership separability. In contrast, French and Spanish display greater resilience due to higher morphological complexity. Overall, our findings provide the first quantitative evidence that language matters in privacy leakage, underscoring the need for language-aware privacy-preserving mechanisms in LLM deployments.
Key Contributions
- First quantitative cross-lingual analysis linking linguistic properties (redundancy, morphological complexity, tokenization granularity) to LLM privacy vulnerability
- Evaluation of extraction, counterfactual memorization, and membership inference attacks across English, Spanish, French, and Italian medical LLMs
- Evidence that Italian exhibits the strongest leakage while French and Spanish show greater resilience due to morphological richness
🛡️ Threat Analysis
Extraction and counterfactual memorization attacks are directly evaluated as methods to recover private training data from fine-tuned LLMs across four languages.
Membership inference attacks are explicitly evaluated, showing English fine-tuned models exhibit the clearest in/out sample separability.