Membership Inference Attacks on Tokenizers of Large Language Models
Meng Tong 1, Yuntao Du 2, Kejiang Chen 1, Weiming Zhang 1, Ninghui Li 2
Published on arXiv
2510.05699
Membership Inference Attack
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML04
Key Finding
MIA via vocabulary signal achieves AUC of 0.771 on a tokenizer with 200,000 tokens (comparable to OpenAI's latest release scale), while the frequency-based attack achieves AUC 0.740
Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are widely used to assess the privacy risks associated with machine learning models. However, when these attacks are applied to pre-trained large language models (LLMs), they encounter significant challenges, including mislabeled samples, distribution shifts, and discrepancies in model size between experimental and real-world settings. To address these limitations, we introduce tokenizers as a new attack vector for membership inference. Specifically, a tokenizer converts raw text into tokens for LLMs. Unlike full models, tokenizers can be efficiently trained from scratch, thereby avoiding the aforementioned challenges. In addition, the tokenizer's training data is typically representative of the data used to pre-train LLMs. Despite these advantages, the potential of tokenizers as an attack vector remains unexplored. To this end, we present the first study on membership leakage through tokenizers and explore five attack methods to infer dataset membership. Extensive experiments on millions of Internet samples reveal the vulnerabilities in the tokenizers of state-of-the-art LLMs. To mitigate this emerging risk, we further propose an adaptive defense. Our findings highlight tokenizers as an overlooked yet critical privacy threat, underscoring the urgent need for privacy-preserving mechanisms specifically designed for them.
Key Contributions
- First membership inference attack study targeting LLM tokenizers as a proxy for pre-training data, bypassing challenges (mislabeled samples, distribution shift, model size) that afflict LLM-level MIAs
- Five attack methods exploiting tokenizer properties — merge similarity, vocabulary overlap, and frequency estimation — to infer dataset membership
- Adaptive defense mechanism to mitigate privacy leakage through tokenizers, plus evidence that scaling laws may increase tokenizer vulnerability
🛡️ Threat Analysis
Paper's primary contribution is five membership inference attack methods targeting LLM tokenizers to determine whether specific text samples were included in pre-training corpora — a classic MIA framing (binary yes/no membership) with a novel attack vector (tokenizer vocabulary, merge rules, and frequency statistics rather than the full model).