Mirage Fools the Ear, Mute Hides the Truth: Precise Targeted Adversarial Attacks on Polyphonic Sound Event Detection Systems
Junjie Su 1, Weifei Jin 1, Yuxin Cao 2, Derui Wang 3, Kai Ye 4, Jie Hao 1
Published on arXiv
2510.02158
Input Manipulation Attack
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML01
Key Finding
M2A achieves 94.56% Editing Precision on CRNN and 99.11% on ATST-SED, outperforming existing audio adversarial attack methods in both effectiveness and precision
M2A (Mirage and Mute Attack)
Novel technique introduced
Sound Event Detection (SED) systems are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications such as industrial monitoring and audio surveillance. However, their robustness against adversarial attacks has not been well explored. Existing audio adversarial attacks targeting SED systems, which incorporate both detection and localization capabilities, often lack effectiveness due to SED's strong contextual dependencies or lack precision by focusing solely on misclassifying the target region as the target event, inadvertently affecting non-target regions. To address these challenges, we propose the Mirage and Mute Attack (M2A) framework, which is designed for targeted adversarial attacks on polyphonic SED systems. In our optimization process, we impose specific constraints on the non-target output, which we refer to as preservation loss, ensuring that our attack does not alter the model outputs for non-target region, thus achieving precise attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a novel evaluation metric Editing Precison (EP) that balances effectiveness and precision, enabling our method to simultaneously enhance both. Comprehensive experiments show that M2A achieves 94.56% and 99.11% EP on two state-of-the-art SED models, demonstrating that the framework is sufficiently effective while significantly enhancing attack precision.
Key Contributions
- First adversarial attack framework for polyphonic Sound Event Detection supporting both event insertion (Mirage) and deletion (Mute) with targeted temporal precision
- Novel preservation loss constraint that restricts perturbations from affecting non-target temporal regions, improving attack stealthiness and precision
- New evaluation metric Editing Precision (EP) that jointly quantifies Attack Success Rate and Unintended Editing Rate for a holistic assessment of SED adversarial attacks
🛡️ Threat Analysis
M2A crafts gradient-optimized adversarial audio perturbations that cause targeted misclassification (event insertion/deletion) in SED models at inference time — classic input manipulation attack with novel preservation loss to constrain non-target regions and a new precision metric (EP).