Towards Safe Reasoning in Large Reasoning Models via Corrective Intervention
Yichi Zhang 1, Yue Ding 1, Jingwen Yang 2,3, Tianwei Luo 4, Dongbai Li 1, Ranjie Duan 5,1, Qiang Liu 1, Hang Su 1, Yinpeng Dong 5,1, Jun Zhu 5
Published on arXiv
2509.24393
Prompt Injection
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM01
Key Finding
IPO achieves over 30% relative reduction in harmfulness on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks compared to SFT-based and RL-based baselines while preserving performance on diverse reasoning tasks.
IPO (Intervened Preference Optimization)
Novel technique introduced
Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.
Key Contributions
- Identifies that LRM chain-of-thought reasoning contains harmful content that persists even when final responses appear safe, a previously overlooked attack surface
- Uncovers three critical insights about unsafe reasoning: safety consolidation at critical trigger steps, compliance cues predicting unsafe continuations, and corrective interventions reliably steering trajectories to safety
- Proposes Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), which constructs preference pairs by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers, achieving >30% relative reduction in harmfulness over SFT and RL baselines