Evil Vizier: Vulnerabilities of LLM-Integrated XR Systems
Yicheng Zhang 1,2, Zijian Huang 2, Sophie Chen 2, Erfan Shayegani 1, Jiasi Chen 2, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh 1
Published on arXiv
2509.15213
Prompt Injection
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM01
Excessive Agency
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM08
Key Finding
Multiple commercial XR-LLM platforms (Meta Quest 3, Ray-Ban, HoloLens 2) share a common vulnerability where attackers manipulating surrounding environmental context can produce erroneous visual/auditory feedback that compromises user safety and privacy.
Evil Vizier
Novel technique introduced
Extended reality (XR) applications increasingly integrate Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance user experience, scene understanding, and even generate executable XR content, and are often called "AI glasses". Despite these potential benefits, the integrated XR-LLM pipeline makes XR applications vulnerable to new forms of attacks. In this paper, we analyze LLM-Integated XR systems in the literature and in practice and categorize them along different dimensions from a systems perspective. Building on this categorization, we identify a common threat model and demonstrate a series of proof-of-concept attacks on multiple XR platforms that employ various LLM models (Meta Quest 3, Meta Ray-Ban, Android, and Microsoft HoloLens 2 running Llama and GPT models). Although these platforms each implement LLM integration differently, they share vulnerabilities where an attacker can modify the public context surrounding a legitimate LLM query, resulting in erroneous visual or auditory feedback to users, thus compromising their safety or privacy, sowing confusion, or other harmful effects. To defend against these threats, we discuss mitigation strategies and best practices for developers, including an initial defense prototype, and call on the community to develop new protection mechanisms to mitigate these risks.
Key Contributions
- Taxonomy of LLM-integrated XR systems categorized from a systems-security perspective, identifying a common threat model across platforms
- Proof-of-concept attacks on Meta Quest 3, Meta Ray-Ban, Android, and Microsoft HoloLens 2 showing that environmental context manipulation causes erroneous LLM outputs compromising user safety and privacy
- Initial defense prototype and mitigation guidelines for XR-LLM developers against context injection attacks