CTCC: A Robust and Stealthy Fingerprinting Framework for Large Language Models via Cross-Turn Contextual Correlation Backdoor
Zhenhua Xu 1, Xixiang Zhao 2, Xubin Yue 1, Shengwei Tian 3, Changting Lin 1,3, Meng Han 1,3
Published on arXiv
2509.09703
Model Theft
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML05
Model Theft
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM10
Key Finding
CTCC consistently achieves stronger stealthiness and robustness than prior fingerprinting methods across multiple LLM architectures, resisting both perplexity-based input detection and adversarial post-deployment modifications while supporting fingerprint verification under black-box access.
CTCC (Cross-Turn Contextual Correlation)
Novel technique introduced
The widespread deployment of large language models (LLMs) has intensified concerns around intellectual property (IP) protection, as model theft and unauthorized redistribution become increasingly feasible. To address this, model fingerprinting aims to embed verifiable ownership traces into LLMs. However, existing methods face inherent trade-offs between stealthness, robustness, and generalizability, being either detectable via distributional shifts, vulnerable to adversarial modifications, or easily invalidated once the fingerprint is revealed. In this work, we introduce CTCC, a novel rule-driven fingerprinting framework that encodes contextual correlations across multiple dialogue turns, such as counterfactual, rather than relying on token-level or single-turn triggers. CTCC enables fingerprint verification under black-box access while mitigating false positives and fingerprint leakage, supporting continuous construction under a shared semantic rule even if partial triggers are exposed. Extensive experiments across multiple LLM architectures demonstrate that CTCC consistently achieves stronger stealth and robustness than prior work. Our findings position CTCC as a reliable and practical solution for ownership verification in real-world LLM deployment scenarios. Our code and data are publicly available at <https://github.com/Xuzhenhua55/CTCC>.
Key Contributions
- Cross-Turn Contextual Correlation (CTCC) backdoor that distributes fingerprint trigger conditions across multiple dialogue turns, activating only when a structured semantic predicate (e.g., counterfactual inconsistency) is satisfied across the conversation history
- Rule-driven fingerprint design that supports continuous fingerprint construction under a shared semantic rule even after partial trigger exposure, mitigating fingerprint leakage
- Demonstrated superior stealthiness (resists perplexity-based detection) and robustness (resists adversarial modifications such as fine-tuning and model merging) over prior LLM fingerprinting methods
🛡️ Threat Analysis
CTCC embeds an invasive backdoor-based fingerprint inside LLM weights to prove model ownership under black-box access — a direct defense against model theft and unauthorized redistribution. The fingerprint is in the MODEL to verify IP, not in the outputs for content provenance.