Federated Learning: An approach with Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption
Pedro Correia 1, Ivan Silva 2, Ivone Amorim 2, Eva Maia 2, Isabel Praça 2
Published on arXiv
2509.03427
Model Inversion Attack
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML03
Key Finding
Achieves 97.6% accuracy (1.3% below plaintext) while reducing client upload bandwidth by over 2,000x and cutting client runtime by 30% compared to a pure BFV-FHE baseline
HHE-FL (PASTA + BFV)
Novel technique introduced
Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning approach that promises privacy by keeping the data on the device. However, gradient reconstruction and membership-inference attacks show that model updates still leak information. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) can address those privacy concerns but it suffers from ciphertext expansion and requires prohibitive overhead on resource-constrained devices. We propose the first Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption (HHE) framework for FL that pairs the PASTA symmetric cipher with the BFV FHE scheme. Clients encrypt local model updates with PASTA and send both the lightweight ciphertexts and the PASTA key (itself BFV-encrypted) to the server, which performs a homomorphic evaluation of the decryption circuit of PASTA and aggregates the resulting BFV ciphertexts. A prototype implementation, developed on top of the Flower FL framework, shows that on independently and identically distributed MNIST dataset with 12 clients and 10 training rounds, the proposed HHE system achieves 97.6% accuracy, just 1.3% below plaintext, while reducing client upload bandwidth by over 2,000x and cutting client runtime by 30% compared to a system based solely on the BFV FHE scheme. However, server computational cost increases by roughly 15621x for each client participating in the training phase, a challenge to be addressed in future work.
Key Contributions
- First end-to-end HHE-FL framework pairing the PASTA symmetric cipher with BFV FHE for secure gradient aggregation
- Single-key distribution strategy enabling homomorphic FedAvg aggregation with minimal client-side encryption and communication cost
- Prototype on Flower FL framework demonstrating 97.6% accuracy with 2,000x bandwidth reduction and 30% lower client runtime vs pure BFV-FHE
🛡️ Threat Analysis
Primary motivation is preventing gradient reconstruction: the semi-honest server is the adversary who could reconstruct training data from plaintext gradients. HHE (PASTA + BFV) ensures gradients are always encrypted during aggregation, matching the ML03 secure aggregation in FL use-case explicitly described in the guidelines — even though the paper's main contribution is efficiency, it directly defends against gradient leakage.