SoK: Exposing the Generation and Detection Gaps in LLM-Generated Phishing Through Examination of Generation Methods, Content Characteristics, and Countermeasures
Fengchao Chen 1,2, Tingmin Wu 2, Van Nguyen 1,2, Carsten Rudolph 1
Published on arXiv
2508.21457
Output Integrity Attack
OWASP ML Top 10 — ML09
Prompt Injection
OWASP LLM Top 10 — LLM01
Key Finding
LLM-generated phishing achieves ~30% higher click-through rates than human-written phishing while exposing a structural offense-defense asymmetry where offensive techniques adapt dynamically but defenses remain static and reactive.
Phishing campaigns involve adversaries masquerading as trusted vendors trying to trigger user behavior that enables them to exfiltrate private data. While URLs are an important part of phishing campaigns, communicative elements like text and images are central in triggering the required user behavior. Further, due to advances in phishing detection, attackers react by scaling campaigns to larger numbers and diversifying and personalizing content. In addition to established mechanisms, such as template-based generation, large language models (LLMs) can be used for phishing content generation, enabling attacks to scale in minutes, challenging existing phishing detection paradigms through personalized content, stealthy explicit phishing keywords, and dynamic adaptation to diverse attack scenarios. Countering these dynamically changing attack campaigns requires a comprehensive understanding of the complex LLM-related threat landscape. Existing studies are fragmented and focus on specific areas. In this work, we provide the first holistic examination of LLM-generated phishing content. First, to trace the exploitation pathways of LLMs for phishing content generation, we adopt a modular taxonomy documenting nine stages by which adversaries breach LLM safety guardrails. We then characterize how LLM-generated phishing manifests as threats, revealing that it evades detectors while emphasizing human cognitive manipulation. Third, by taxonomizing defense techniques aligned with generation methods, we expose a critical asymmetry that offensive mechanisms adapt dynamically to attack scenarios, whereas defensive strategies remain static and reactive. Finally, based on a thorough analysis of the existing literature, we highlight insights and gaps and suggest a roadmap for understanding and countering LLM-driven phishing at scale.
Key Contributions
- Modular taxonomy of nine stages by which adversaries systematically breach LLM safety guardrails to generate phishing content
- Characterization of LLM-generated phishing content and how it evades detectors while targeting human cognitive manipulation
- Taxonomy of defense techniques aligned with generation methods, exposing a critical asymmetry between dynamic offensive mechanisms and static/reactive defensive strategies
🛡️ Threat Analysis
The paper systematically analyzes how LLM-generated phishing content evades existing detectors, covering AI-generated content detection evasion and the asymmetry between dynamic offensive LLM output generation and static defensive detection strategies — this is output integrity and AI-generated content detection.