Xiyang Hu

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as rerankers in information retrieval, yet their ranking behavior can be steered by small, natural-sounding prompts. To expose this vulnerability, we present Rank Anything First (RAF), a two-stage token optimization method that crafts concise textual perturbations to consistently promote a target item in LLM-generated rankings while remaining hard to detect. Stage 1 uses Greedy Coordinate Gradient to shortlist candidate tokens at the current position by combining the gradient of the rank-target with a readability score; Stage 2 evaluates those candidates under exact ranking and readability losses using an entropy-based dynamic weighting scheme, and selects a token via temperature-controlled sampling. RAF generates ranking-promoting prompts token-by-token, guided by dual objectives: maximizing ranking effectiveness and preserving linguistic naturalness. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that RAF significantly boosts the rank of target items using naturalistic language, with greater robustness than existing methods in both promoting target items and maintaining naturalness. These findings underscore a critical security implication: LLM-based reranking is inherently susceptible to adversarial manipulation, raising new challenges for the trustworthiness and robustness of modern retrieval systems. Our code is available at: https://github.com/glad-lab/RAF.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are rapidly replacing unimodal encoders in modern retrieval and recommendation systems. While their capabilities are well-documented, their robustness against adversarial manipulation in competitive ranking scenarios remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we uncover a critical vulnerability in VLM-based product search: multimodal ranking attacks. We present Multimodal Generative Engine Optimization (MGEO), a novel adversarial framework that enables a malicious actor to unfairly promote a target product by jointly optimizing imperceptible image perturbations and fluent textual suffixes. Unlike existing attacks that treat modalities in isolation, MGEO employs an alternating gradient-based optimization strategy to exploit the deep cross-modal coupling within the VLM. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets using state-of-the-art models demonstrate that our coordinated attack significantly outperforms text-only and image-only baselines. These findings reveal that multimodal synergy, typically a strength of VLMs, can be weaponized to compromise the integrity of search rankings without triggering conventional content filters.