Jiate Li

Large language models (LLMs) have been serving as effective backbones for retrieval systems, including Retrieval-Augmentation-Generation (RAG), Dense Information Retriever (IR), and Agent Memory Retrieval. Recent studies have demonstrated that such LLM-based Retrieval (LLMR) is vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which manipulates documents by token-level injections and enables adversaries to either boost or diminish these documents in retrieval tasks. However, existing attack studies mainly (1) presume a known query is given to the attacker, and (2) highly rely on access to the victim model's parameters or interactions, which are hardly accessible in real-world scenarios, leading to limited validity. To further explore the secure risks of LLMR, we propose a practical black-box attack method that generates transferable injection tokens based on zero-shot surrogate LLMs without need of victim queries or victim models knowledge. The effectiveness of our attack raises such a robustness issue that similar effects may arise from benign or unintended document edits in the real world. To achieve our attack, we first establish a theoretical framework of LLMR and empirically verify it. Under the framework, we simulate the transferable attack as a min-max problem, and propose an adversarial learning mechanism that finds optimal adversarial tokens with learnable query samples. Our attack is validated to be effective on benchmark datasets across popular LLM retrievers.

Graph machine learning has advanced rapidly in tasks such as link prediction, anomaly detection, and node classification. As models scale up, pretrained graph models have become valuable intellectual assets because they encode extensive computation and domain expertise. Building on these advances, Graph Foundation Models (GFMs) mark a major step forward by jointly pretraining graph and text encoders on massive and diverse data. This unifies structural and semantic understanding, enables zero-shot inference, and supports applications such as fraud detection and biomedical analysis. However, the high pretraining cost and broad cross-domain knowledge in GFMs also make them attractive targets for model extraction attacks (MEAs). Prior work has focused only on small graph neural networks trained on a single graph, leaving the security implications for large-scale and multimodal GFMs largely unexplored. This paper presents the first systematic study of MEAs against GFMs. We formalize a black-box threat model and define six practical attack scenarios covering domain-level and graph-specific extraction goals, architectural mismatch, limited query budgets, partial node access, and training data discrepancies. To instantiate these attacks, we introduce a lightweight extraction method that trains an attacker encoder using supervised regression of graph embeddings. Even without contrastive pretraining data, this method learns an encoder that stays aligned with the victim text encoder and preserves its zero-shot inference ability on unseen graphs. Experiments on seven datasets show that the attacker can approximate the victim model using only a tiny fraction of its original training cost, with almost no loss in accuracy. These findings reveal that GFMs greatly expand the MEA surface and highlight the need for deployment-aware security defenses in large-scale graph learning systems.