SGM: Safety Glasses for Multimodal Large Language Models via Neuron-Level Detoxification
Hongbo Wang, MaungMaung AprilPyone, Isao Echizen · The University of Tokyo · National Institute of Informatics +1 more
Hongbo Wang, MaungMaung AprilPyone, Isao Echizen · The University of Tokyo · National Institute of Informatics +1 more
Neuron-level white-box defense suppresses toxic expert neurons in VLMs, cutting harmful outputs from 48% to 2.5% under adversarial jailbreaks
Disclaimer: Samples in this paper may be harmful and cause discomfort. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) enable multimodal generation but inherit toxic, biased, and NSFW signals from weakly curated pretraining corpora, causing safety risks, especially under adversarial triggers that late, opaque training-free detoxification methods struggle to handle. We propose SGM, a white-box neuron-level multimodal intervention that acts like safety glasses for toxic neurons: it selectively recalibrates a small set of toxic expert neurons via expertise-weighted soft suppression, neutralizing harmful cross-modal activations without any parameter updates. We establish MM-TOXIC-QA, a multimodal toxicity evaluation framework, and compare SGM with existing detoxification techniques. Experiments on open-source MLLMs show that SGM mitigates toxicity in standard and adversarial conditions, cutting harmful rates from 48.2\% to 2.5\% while preserving fluency and multimodal reasoning. SGM is extensible, and its combined defenses, denoted as SGM*, integrate with existing detoxification methods for stronger safety performance, providing an interpretable, low-cost solution for toxicity-controlled multimodal generation.
Jun Liu, Leo Yu Zhang, Fengpeng Li et al. · University of Macau · National Institute of Informatics +2 more
Hard-label black-box adversarial attack using frequency-domain initialization and pattern-driven optimization to recover gradient sign information
Hard-label black-box settings, where only top-1 predicted labels are observable, pose a fundamentally constrained yet practically important feedback model for understanding model behavior. A central challenge in this regime is whether meaningful gradient information can be recovered from such discrete responses. In this work, we develop a unified theoretical perspective showing that a wide range of existing sign-flipping hard-label attacks can be interpreted as implicitly approximating the sign of the true loss gradient. This observation reframes hard-label attacks from heuristic search procedures into instances of gradient sign recovery under extremely limited feedback. Motivated by this first-principles understanding, we propose a new attack framework that combines a zero-query frequency-domain initialization with a Pattern-Driven Optimization (PDO) strategy. We establish theoretical guarantees demonstrating that, under mild assumptions, our initialization achieves higher expected cosine similarity to the true gradient sign compared to random baselines, while the proposed PDO procedure attains substantially lower query complexity than existing structured search approaches. We empirically validate our framework through extensive experiments on CIFAR-10, ImageNet, and ObjectNet, covering standard and adversarially trained models, commercial APIs, and CLIP-based models. The results show that our method consistently surpasses SOTA hard-label attacks in both attack success rate and query efficiency, particularly in low-query regimes. Beyond image classification, our approach generalizes effectively to corrupted data, biomedical datasets, and dense prediction tasks. Notably, it also successfully circumvents Blacklight, a SOTA stateful defense, resulting in a $0\%$ detection rate. Our code will be released publicly soon at https://github.com/csjunjun/DPAttack.git.