Meng Han

The rapid growth of large language models raises pressing concerns about intellectual property protection under black-box deployment. Existing backdoor-based fingerprints either rely on rare tokens -- leading to high-perplexity inputs susceptible to filtering -- or use fixed trigger-response mappings that are brittle to leakage and post-hoc adaptation. We propose \textsc{Dual-Layer Nested Fingerprinting} (DNF), a black-box method that embeds a hierarchical backdoor by coupling domain-specific stylistic cues with implicit semantic triggers. Across Mistral-7B, LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct, and Falcon3-7B-Instruct, DNF achieves perfect fingerprint activation while preserving downstream utility. Compared with existing methods, it uses lower-perplexity triggers, remains undetectable under fingerprint detection attacks, and is relatively robust to incremental fine-tuning and model merging. These results position DNF as a practical, stealthy, and resilient solution for LLM ownership verification and intellectual property protection.

Existing invasive (backdoor) fingerprints suffer from high-perplexity triggers that are easily filtered, fixed response patterns exposed by heuristic detectors, and spurious activations on benign inputs. We introduce \textsc{ForgetMark}, a stealthy fingerprinting framework that encodes provenance via targeted unlearning. It builds a compact, human-readable key--value set with an assistant model and predictive-entropy ranking, then trains lightweight LoRA adapters to suppress the original values on their keys while preserving general capabilities. Ownership is verified under black/gray-box access by aggregating likelihood and semantic evidence into a fingerprint success rate. By relying on probabilistic forgetting traces rather than fixed trigger--response patterns, \textsc{ForgetMark} avoids high-perplexity triggers, reduces detectability, and lowers false triggers. Across diverse architectures and settings, it achieves 100\% ownership verification on fingerprinted models while maintaining standard performance, surpasses backdoor baselines in stealthiness and robustness to model merging, and remains effective under moderate incremental fine-tuning. Our code and data are available at \href{https://github.com/Xuzhenhua55/ForgetMark}{https://github.com/Xuzhenhua55/ForgetMark}.

Identity, accent, style, and emotions are essential components of human speech. Voice conversion (VC) techniques process the speech signals of two input speakers and other modalities of auxiliary information such as prompts and emotion tags. It changes para-linguistic features from one to another, while maintaining linguistic contents. Recently, VC models have made rapid advancements in both generation quality and personalization capabilities. These developments have attracted considerable attention for diverse applications, including privacy preservation, voice-print reproduction for the deceased, and dysarthric speech recovery. However, these models only learn non-robust features due to the clean training data. Subsequently, it results in unsatisfactory performances when dealing with degraded input speech in real-world scenarios, including additional noise, reverberation, adversarial attacks, or even minor perturbation. Hence, it demands robust deployments, especially in real-world settings. Although latest researches attempt to find potential attacks and countermeasures for VC systems, there remains a significant gap in the comprehensive understanding of how robust the VC model is under input manipulation. here also raises many questions: For instance, to what extent do different forms of input degradation attacks alter the expected output of VC models? Is there potential for optimizing these attack and defense strategies? To answer these questions, we classify existing attack and defense methods from the perspective of input manipulation and evaluate the impact of degraded input speech across four dimensions, including intelligibility, naturalness, timbre similarity, and subjective perception. Finally, we outline open issues and future directions.

Protecting the intellectual property of large language models requires robust ownership verification. Conventional backdoor fingerprinting, however, is flawed by a stealth-robustness paradox: to be robust, these methods force models to memorize fixed responses to high-perplexity triggers, but this targeted overfitting creates detectable statistical artifacts. We resolve this paradox with KinGuard, a framework that embeds a private knowledge corpus built on structured kinship narratives. Instead of memorizing superficial triggers, the model internalizes this knowledge via incremental pre-training, and ownership is verified by probing its conceptual understanding. Extensive experiments demonstrate KinGuard's superior effectiveness, stealth, and resilience against a battery of attacks including fine-tuning, input perturbation, and model merging. Our work establishes knowledge-based embedding as a practical and secure paradigm for model fingerprinting.

LLM-based web agents have become increasingly popular for their utility in daily life and work. However, they exhibit critical vulnerabilities when processing malicious URLs: accepting a disguised malicious URL enables subsequent access to unsafe webpages, which can cause severe damage to service providers and users. Despite this risk, no benchmark currently targets this emerging threat. To address this gap, we propose MalURLBench, the first benchmark for evaluating LLMs' vulnerabilities to malicious URLs. MalURLBench contains 61,845 attack instances spanning 10 real-world scenarios and 7 categories of real malicious websites. Experiments with 12 popular LLMs reveal that existing models struggle to detect elaborately disguised malicious URLs. We further identify and analyze key factors that impact attack success rates and propose URLGuard, a lightweight defense module. We believe this work will provide a foundational resource for advancing the security of web agents. Our code is available at https://github.com/JiangYingEr/MalURLBench.