defense arXiv Jan 13, 2026 · 11w ago
Zhenhua Xu, Yiran Zhao, Mengting Zhong et al. · Zhejiang University · Binjiang Institute of Zhejiang University +3 more
Hierarchical backdoor fingerprinting embeds nested stylistic and semantic triggers in LLMs to prove ownership against black-box theft
Model Theft Model Theft nlp
The rapid growth of large language models raises pressing concerns about intellectual property protection under black-box deployment. Existing backdoor-based fingerprints either rely on rare tokens -- leading to high-perplexity inputs susceptible to filtering -- or use fixed trigger-response mappings that are brittle to leakage and post-hoc adaptation. We propose \textsc{Dual-Layer Nested Fingerprinting} (DNF), a black-box method that embeds a hierarchical backdoor by coupling domain-specific stylistic cues with implicit semantic triggers. Across Mistral-7B, LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct, and Falcon3-7B-Instruct, DNF achieves perfect fingerprint activation while preserving downstream utility. Compared with existing methods, it uses lower-perplexity triggers, remains undetectable under fingerprint detection attacks, and is relatively robust to incremental fine-tuning and model merging. These results position DNF as a practical, stealthy, and resilient solution for LLM ownership verification and intellectual property protection.
llm transformer Zhejiang University · Binjiang Institute of Zhejiang University · GenTel.io +2 more
benchmark arXiv Jan 26, 2026 · 10w ago
Dezhang Kong, Zhuxi Wu, Shiqi Liu et al. · Zhejiang University · National University of Malaysia +4 more
Benchmark revealing LLM web agents fail to detect disguised malicious URLs across 61K attack instances in 10 real-world scenarios
Prompt Injection nlp
LLM-based web agents have become increasingly popular for their utility in daily life and work. However, they exhibit critical vulnerabilities when processing malicious URLs: accepting a disguised malicious URL enables subsequent access to unsafe webpages, which can cause severe damage to service providers and users. Despite this risk, no benchmark currently targets this emerging threat. To address this gap, we propose MalURLBench, the first benchmark for evaluating LLMs' vulnerabilities to malicious URLs. MalURLBench contains 61,845 attack instances spanning 10 real-world scenarios and 7 categories of real malicious websites. Experiments with 12 popular LLMs reveal that existing models struggle to detect elaborately disguised malicious URLs. We further identify and analyze key factors that impact attack success rates and propose URLGuard, a lightweight defense module. We believe this work will provide a foundational resource for advancing the security of web agents. Our code is available at https://github.com/JiangYingEr/MalURLBench.
llm Zhejiang University · National University of Malaysia · Hangzhou City University +3 more