Gejian Zhao

Backdoor attacks pose a significant security threat to natural language processing (NLP) systems, but existing methods lack explainable trigger mechanisms and fail to quantitatively model vulnerability patterns. This work pioneers the quantitative connection between explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) and backdoor attacks, introducing Sensitron, a novel modular framework for crafting stealthy and robust backdoor triggers. Sensitron employs a progressive refinement approach where Dynamic Meta-Sensitivity Analysis (DMSA) first identifies potentially vulnerable input tokens, Hierarchical SHAP Estimation (H-SHAP) then provides explainable attribution to precisely pinpoint the most influential tokens, and finally a Plug-and-Rank mechanism that generates contextually appropriate triggers. We establish the first mathematical correlation (Sensitivity Ranking Correlation, SRC=0.83) between explainability scores and empirical attack success, enabling precise targeting of model vulnerabilities. Sensitron achieves 97.8% Attack Success Rate (ASR) (+5.8% over state-of-the-art (SOTA)) with 85.4% ASR at 0.1% poisoning rate, demonstrating robust resistance against multiple SOTA defenses. This work reveals fundamental NLP vulnerabilities and provides new attack vectors through weaponized explainability.

As a valuable digital product, deep neural networks (DNNs) face increasingly severe threats to the intellectual property, making it necessary to develop effective technical measures to protect them. Trigger-based watermarking methods achieve copyright protection by embedding triggers into the host DNNs. However, the attacker may remove the watermark by pruning or fine-tuning. We model this interaction as a game under conditions of information asymmetry, namely, the defender embeds a secret watermark with private knowledge, while the attacker can only access the watermarked model and seek removal. We define strategies, costs, and utilities for both players, derive the attacker's optimal pruning budget, and establish an exponential lower bound on the accuracy of watermark detection after attack. Experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of the watermarked model, and indicate that sparse watermarking can resist removal with negligible accuracy loss. This study highlights the effectiveness of game-theoretic analysis in guiding the design of robust watermarking schemes for model copyright protection.