Yanshu Li

While the deployment of large language models (LLMs) in high-value industries continues to expand, the systematic assessment of their safety against jailbreak and prompt-based attacks remains insufficient. Existing safety evaluation benchmarks and frameworks are often limited by an imbalanced integration of core components (attack, defense, and evaluation methods) and an isolation between flexible evaluation frameworks and standardized benchmarking capabilities. These limitations hinder reliable cross-study comparisons and create unnecessary overhead for comprehensive risk assessment. To address these gaps, we present TeleAI-Safety, a modular and reproducible framework coupled with a systematic benchmark for rigorous LLM safety evaluation. Our framework integrates a broad collection of 19 attack methods (including one self-developed method), 29 defense methods, and 19 evaluation methods (including one self-developed method). With a curated attack corpus of 342 samples spanning 12 distinct risk categories, the TeleAI-Safety benchmark conducts extensive evaluations across 14 target models. The results reveal systematic vulnerabilities and model-specific failure cases, highlighting critical trade-offs between safety and utility, and identifying potential defense patterns for future optimization. In practical scenarios, TeleAI-Safety can be flexibly adjusted with customized attack, defense, and evaluation combinations to meet specific demands. We release our complete code and evaluation results to facilitate reproducible research and establish unified safety baselines.

Safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) still show two dominant failure modes: they are easily jailbroken, or they over-refuse harmless inputs that contain sensitive surface signals. We trace both to a common cause: current models reason weakly about links between actions and outcomes and over-rely on surface-form signals, lexical or stylistic cues that do not encode consequences. We define this failure mode as Consequence-blindness. To study consequence-blindness, we build a benchmark named CB-Bench covering four risk scenarios that vary whether semantic risk aligns with outcome risk, enabling evaluation under both matched and mismatched conditions which are often ignored by existing safety benchmarks. Mainstream models consistently fail to separate these risks and exhibit consequence-blindness, indicating that consequence-blindness is widespread and systematic. To mitigate consequence-blindness, we introduce CS-Chain-4k, a consequence-reasoning dataset for safety alignment. Models fine-tuned on CS-Chain-4k show clear gains against semantic-camouflage jailbreaks and reduce over-refusal on harmless inputs, while maintaining utility and generalization on other benchmarks. These results clarify the limits of current alignment, establish consequence-aware reasoning as a core alignment goal and provide a more practical and reproducible evaluation path.